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Benton, Matthew Hale (Ph.D., Economics)
Air Quality Regulation and the Reduction of Toxic and Greenhouse Gases
Thesis directed by Prof. Nicholas Flores
The focus of this dissertation is to examine the effect of county-level air quality regulatory
status on polluting behavior across counties. Ozone is regulated subject to the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) of the Clean Air Act. When a county is out of compliance (or
out of attainment) for the ozone standard, the county implements a strict plan for reducing the
concentrations of precursors to ozone which are volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx). I use county-level attainment status for 1-hour ozone as a proxy for air quality
regulatory regime. Regulation of ozone creates a tighter regulatory climate that could spill over
and lead to reduced emissions of a large range of pollutants (both regulated and unregulated),
primarily those tracked by the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory. From estimation using panel data
in a fixed-effects framework, the results provide support for the existence of spillovers as evidenced
by the reduction of non-VOC emissions associated with non-attainment status of 1-hour ozone and
by the reduction of unregulated industrial carbon dioxide emissions.
I also use county-level measures of pro-environment voting from the U.S.House of Represen-
tatives as a proxy for regional heterogeneity in preferences of citizens for more or less regulation
in order to estimate their effect on toxic air emissions at a local level. Even though constructing
county-level voting scores from congressional district scores requires a degree of approximation in
counties that lie partially in multiple districts, the fact that county lines do not change with the
decennial Census allows for measures of emissions activity in specific locations over time when using
panel data spanning more than ten years. From estimation using panel data in a fixed-effects frame-
work, the results suggest that allowing for regional heterogeneity in preferences at the county level
can explain within-state variation in toxic emissions where state-level aggregates fail to identify
such a relationship.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The focus of this dissertation is to examine the effect of county-level air quality regulatory
status on polluting behavior across counties. The general approach I use in order to analyze this
problem is to first consider the overall effect regulation has on county-level emissions and then
I attempt to identify two separate effects that could lead to higher or lower emissions within a
county. These two separate effects occur along the extensive and intensive margins. The extensive
margin includes firm location and shut-down decisions, while the intensive margin includes facilities
reducing their individual emissions. A tighter regulatory climate could create incentives for firms
to respond along either of these margins in order to maximize profit, depending on whether it is
less costly to relocate in order to avoid imposed costs associated with regulation or whether it is in
the firms best interest to reduce output or to install more efficient technology. Firm response along
the extensive margin likely leads only to a redistribution outcome, but response along the intensive
margin could lead to lower per facility emissions which would lower emissions in one county without
leading to an increase in emissions in another county.
When addressing this problem of the effect of a tighter regulatory climate on emission levels,
one of the main difficulties is finding a measure to describe regulatory stringency since no direct
measure exists. Researchers are then forced to rely on proxies and make certain assumptions to
justify their use. In this dissertation I use two different proxies. The first proxy I use is a somewhat
direct measure of regulatory stringency even though certain assumptions still need to be made.
Nonattainment status is a proxy for regulation that is commonly used in the literature. The second
2proxy I use is an indirect measure of regulatory stringency that has been used in the literature,
but has only been used in analyses that do so at the state level. Pro-environment voting scores
from the League of Conservation Voters works as a proxy indirectly through citizen preferences for
more or less regulation. For this research I create county-level measures for this proxy, which, to
the best of my knowledge, have not been previously used in the literature.
In chapter 2, I use county-level attainment status for 1-hour ozone as a proxy for air quality
regulatory regime and estimate the effect it has on both regulated and unregulated toxic emissions
as well as on unregulated carbon dioxide from cropland production. Ozone is regulated subject to
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) of the Clean Air Act. When a county is out
of attainment (or out of compliance) for the ozone standard, the state implements a strict plan for
reducing the concentrations of precursors to ozone which are volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Regulation of ozone creates a tighter regulatory climate that could spill
over and lead to reduced emissions for a large range of pollutants (both regulated and unregulated),
primarily those tracked by the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory. The results provide support for
the existence of spillovers as evidenced by the reduction of non-VOC emissions associated with
nonattainment status of 1-hour ozone.
In chapter 3, I extend the analysis from chapter 2 to take a closer look at the effect of
ozone nonattainment status on industrial carbon dioxide before it was regulated, since the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency is currently in the initial phase of regulating stationary sources
of industrial carbon dioxide emissions. Permit requirements for construction of new and modified
sources are now in place for the largest emitters; operating permits for these largest emitters will
be required later this year; and the EPA is currently in the review process for setting national
performance standards for carbon dioxide. Expanding on previous findings of regulatory spillover
effects that involve reductions of VOCs and non-VOCs in nonattainment areas for the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone, the results suggest that a tighter regulatory climate
(proxied by ozone nonattainment) leads to reductions in unregulated greenhouse gas emissions.
In chapter 4, I use county-level measures of pro-environment voting from the U.S. House
3of Representatives as a proxy for regional heterogeneity in preferences of citizens for more or less
regulation in order to estimate their effect on toxic air emissions at a local level. I use data on
voting records provided by the League of Conservation Voters. Even though constructing county-
level voting scores from congressional district scores requires a degree of approximation in counties
that lie partially in multiple districts, the fact that county lines do not change with the decennial
Census allows for measures of emissions activity in specific locations over time when using panel
data spanning more than ten years. The results suggest that allowing for regional heterogeneity in
preferences at the county level can explain within-state variation in toxic emissions where state-level
aggregates fail to identify such a relationship.
The main contributions of this dissertation to the literature include: disaggregation of the
Toxics Release Inventory to look specifically at the effect of ozone nonattainment on VOCs and
non-VOCs separately to identify regulatory spillover effects in chapter 2; the use of measures of
industrial carbon dioxide to further test for spillover effects in chapter 3; and creating county-level
meausures of League of Conservation Voting Scores to identify the effect of pro-environment voting
on emissions at a more localized level than states in chapter 4.
Chapter 2
Identifying Spillover Effects from Enforcement of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards
In this chapter, I examine the effect of county-level air quality regulatory status on polluting
behavior across counties. Two often analyzed responses of firms to regulations are their choice of
emissions levels and firm location decisions. The emissions data used here capture both behaviors.
I separately examine what is happening at the extensive (facility numbers) and intensive (emission
levels) margins. For the analysis, I use attainment status as a proxy for air quality regulatory
regime where regulation of ozone creates a tighter regulatory climate that could spill over and lead
to reduced emissions of a large range of pollutants.
Ozone is regulated subject to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) of
the Clean Air Act (CAA). To identify spillover effects, I use the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI), which reports emissions of multiple hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) including precursors
for ozone. When a county is out of compliance (or also referred to as being out of attainment) for
ozone, the state implements a strict plan for reducing the precursors to ozone which are volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Since the TRI contains VOCs as well
as non-VOCs, a reduction in VOCs is expected, which consequently would lower the overall TRI
measure. By disaggregating the TRI data, I also examine what happens to non-VOCs due to ozone
nonattainment. Since non-VOC hazardous air pollutants are regulated, although not under the
NAAQS, as a final test for spillovers I estimate the effect of ozone nonattainment on unregulated
greenhouse gas emissions from a combination of on-site and off-site cropland production.
5Previous studies have made a link between nonattainment status for criteria pollutants sub-
ject to the NAAQS of the Clean Air Act and emission levels for those specific pollutants. There
have been no attempts in the existing literature to identify these spillovers. This is important
because not accounting for these spillovers could lead policy-makers to significantly underestimate
the potential benefits (in terms of reduced pollution levels) associated with the NAAQS.
The results provide support for the existence of spillovers as evidenced by the reduction of
non-VOC emissions associated with nonattainment status of 1-hour ozone. The reduction of overall
TRI emissions is caused by reductions of both VOCs and non-VOCs. Since the number of TRI
reporting facilities is decreasing and there is a lack of a statistically significant relationship between
ozone nonattainment and pounds of emissions per facility, I conclude that the exodus of facilities is
the primary reason for decreased emissions. The reduction of unregulated carbon dioxide emissions
associated with cropland production due to ozone nonattainment is further evidence of spillover
effects. This work is the first to address these air quality regulatory spillovers and thus report such
findings.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 The Regulatory Process
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has identified the following six pollutants as cri-
teria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2),
particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5), and lead (Pb). A measure of TSPs (or total suspended par-
ticulates) was used for particulate matter until 1991. Criteria pollutants are those pollutants which
have been determined to endanger public health or welfare. Criteria pollutants fall under the laws
outlined in sections 108-110 of the Clean Air Act1 which defines the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) and Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations sets of maximum allowable
concentrations for each of the six criteria pollutants2 .
1 42 USC §7408-7410 (the same as CAA §108-110)
2 40 CFR §50
6Every year, counties in violation of these standards are designated as nonattainment counties.
Nonattainment areas must have and implement a plan to meet the standard or risk losing some
forms of federal assistance. The standard for 1-hour ozone under the NAAQS stipulates as long
as the highest hourly reading does not exceed 0.12 parts per million (ppm) on more than one
day per year in a county, then a county is in attainment. The standard can also be described as
the second-highest daily maximum or the single-highest hourly reading over all hours and days
of the year, except for the first day with the highest annual hourly reading. The designation of
nonattainment status is one possible and commonly used proxy for regulatory stringency, because
according to Becker and Henderson [10], new and existing plants are subject to much stricter
controls in nonattainment areas, relative to attainment areas. Henderson [35] explains that all
firms in nonattainment counties are more likely to be closely monitored and subject to greater
enforcement efforts.
In addition to the NAAQS criteria pollutants, the EPA and local environmental agencies
monitor and regulate a wide range of other pollutants often referred to as hazardous air pollutants
(HAPs). Currently no federal standards exist limiting the amount of ambient air concentrations of
these pollutants, however, there are regulations in place under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act3
requiring industries to reduce these compounds using the maximum available control technology
(MACT). There are a number of HAPs that are regulated indirectly for NAAQS, because many
HAPs are volatile organic compounds (VOCs) which help form the criteria pollutants ozone and
particulate matter.
2.1.2 Firm Response to Regulation
In the literature on firm behavioral response to environmental regulation there are two main
categories into which firm behavior can be grouped: the intensive margin and the extensive margin.
The intensive margin is the firm’s choice of emission levels and the extensive margin is the firm’s
location choice. Different measures or proxies for regulatory stringency that have been used in pre-
3 42 USC §7412 (Law); 40 CFR §61,63 (Implementation)
7vious studies include nonattainment status for criteria pollutants subject to NAAQS, air pollution
abatement (APA) expenditures such as the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE)
Survey, number of inspections and enforcement activities at facilities, records of green voting in
Congress, and right-to-work status of states.
2.1.2.1 Intensive Margin
The intensive margin is the firm’s choice of emission levels, which could include reducing
output or introducing better technology to meet the emissions standards. The following papers
use nonattainment status for NAAQS criteria pollutants as a proxy for regulatory stringency and
examine the effect of nonattainment status on the corresponding criteria pollutant. Henderson
[35] examines the effects of nonattainment status for 1-hour ozone on levels of ozone. His results
suggest that a switch in county attainment status to nonattainment induces a greater regulatory
effort and results in cleaner air, particularly a 3-8 percent improvement in ground-level ozone.
Greenstone [33] finds that SO2 nonattainment status is associated with modest reductions in SO2
concentrations. Chay and Greenstone [16] and [17] find striking evidence that TSP levels fell
substantially more in TSP nonattainment counties than attainment counties. Aufhammer et al.
[8] examine whether nonattainment status is responsible for the drops in PM10 experienced in
nonattainment counties. In a spatially disaggregated analysis with the emissions monitor as the
unit of observation, monitors that exceed the federal standards experience drops greater than the
average of the remaining monitors within the same county. The county nonattainment status does
not explain a statistically significant share of the variation in PM10 concentrations.
Anton et al. [6] proxy for environmental regulation using inspections and number of superfund
sites. They find that stricter regulation induces firms to adopt more environmental management
systems (EMSs) and environmental management practices (EMPs), which they show reduce emis-
sions of HAPs. Terry and Yandle [57] use environmental expenditures as a proxy for regulatory
action and fail to find a meaningful statistical relationship between expenditures and reductions in
toxic releases using a cross sectional analysis. Becker [11] examines the effect that nonattainment
8status has on air pollution abatement activity at the firm level using the PACE survey. His results
suggest that heavy emitters in nonattainment counties were subject to more stringent regulation
and therefore had higher APA expenditures.
2.1.2.2 Extensive Margin
Firm location decisions are commonly classified as the extensive margin. The types of location
decisions firms make include shifting production across facilities in the case of multi-plant firms,
physically relocating existing operations, and choosing where to open new facilities in order to avoid
the most stringent regulatory standards. Becker and Henderson [10] suggest that firm births fall
dramatically in counties that are in nonattainment for ozone. Using the PACE survey as a measure
of regulatory stringency, Levinson [45] reports that there is little evidence that stringent state
environmental regulations deter new plants from opening. Focusing on the paper and oil industries,
Gray and Shadbegian [29] find that states with stricter regulations have smaller production shares.
They use a variety of proxies for state-level environmental regulation including nonattainment
status, congressional voting records on environmental legislation, pollution abatement spending,
and an index of state environmental laws. Using similar measures of regulatory stringency, Gray [28]
finds that states with stricter regulations tend to have lower birth rates of new plants. Even though
the impacts are not enormous, according to the paper, these results are similar to explanatory
variables such as unionization. Holmes [36] also finds similar results using right-to-work laws (non-
unionization) as a measure of regulatory stringency and reports that these state policies do matter
for firm location decisions. Using border effects he finds that manufacturing employment increases
by about one-third when crossing the border from a non-right-to-work state into a right-to-work
(pro-business) state.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Firm response to regulation is driven by incentives and their objective is to maximize profit
by choosing inputs, location, and production techniques which minimize costs. Without regulation
9firms are not held accountable for the negative externality they create when emitting toxic releases
as a byproduct of the production process. Once the firms are expected to internalize the externality
through regulation, they need to alter their profit-maximizing decision and determine their best
response to the higher costs associated with regulation. This change in profit-maximizing decision
could be choosing to relocate in a county with less strict regulation and subsequently lower costs
associated with production or, if that is cost prohibitive, update to more efficient technology to
lower emissions and avoid fines.
Henderson’s [35] analysis suggests that a switch in county attainment status to nonattainment
induces a greater regulatory effort and results in cleaner air. I expand on the existing literature to
see if ozone nonattainment leads to cleaner air due to lower levels of ozone only or if it leads to
lower levels of ozone as well as other air emissions not related to ozone. The first step is to measure
the effect of regulatory stringency on overall toxic air releases and then proceed by disaggregating
the measures to find if there are separate effects on ozone precursors and those releases that are
unrelated to ozone.
Ozone nonattainment in the current year is expected to be associated with higher levels of
overall emissions than attainment counties, because higher emissions are the reason that the county
is out of attainment. A negative relationship between cumulative number of years a county has
been out of attainment and the levels of emissions in the county is the hypothesized result. The
underlying reasoning is that counties that are not making progress toward returning to attainment
will draw more attention and subsequently stricter enforcement. The higher costs associated with
regulation could create incentives for firms to make decisions to either relocate or to install more
efficient technology in order to maximize profit.
The intended consequence of air quality regulation is a reduction of emissions below an
acceptable safety threshold nationwide which should translate into lower emissions per facility. It is
very conceivable that facilities would leave counties with strict regulation and relocate in attainment
counties where regulation is less strict. This would lower total emissions in nonattainment counties,
but increase total emissions in attainment counties. This case would not necessarily result in a net
10
reduction of emissions, but rather a redistribution of emissions. If facility numbers are increasing,
but pounds per facility are decreasing, then firms are emitting less and that is the primary factor
leading to reduced emissions. Cleaner facilities entering the county is a possible story consistent
with this scenario. The first set of estimations of this chapter tests whether there are lower overall
emissions in ozone nonattainment counties and whether these are due to fewer facilities or fewer
pounds of emissions per facility.
After estimating the effect of ozone nonattainment status on an overall measure of toxic air
releases, if that effect is negative, then it would be informative to examine whether the emissions of
ozone precursors are the only factor influencing this decline in total emissions or whether regulation
has effects on those emissions that are not ozone precursors. Through this disaggregation I am able
to identify spillover effects from the regulation of ozone. Recall that these toxic releases are either
indirectly regulated under the NAAQS for the case of VOCs or under Section 112 of the Clean Air
Act4 which requires employment of maximum available control technology (MACT). However, it is
also desirable to test unregulated greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide to see if there are
additional spillover effects from tighter regulation (as proxied by ozone nonattainment). If there is
a significant negative relationship between years of ozone nonattainment and the levels of the non-
VOCs analyzed here (hydrochloric acid, ammonia, sulfuric acid, chlorine, or carbon dioxide) then
I conclude that the tighter regulatory environment is leading to the reduction of other emissions
besides those related to ozone.
2.3 Data
The data for county nonattainment status is publicly available through the EPA’s website [2].
Beginning in 1978 to 2010, every July counties are listed if they are designated as nonattainment
(either the whole county or part of the county) for one of the criteria pollutants. Attainment status
is used as a proxy for regulatory stringency, because new and existing plants are subject to much
stricter controls in nonattainment areas, relative to attainment areas. Counties in nonattainment
4 42 USC §7412 (Law); 40 CFR §61,63 (Implementation)
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are more likely to be closely monitored and subject to greater enforcement efforts. I focus on the
nonattainment status for 1-hour ozone because there is greater variation of counties moving into
and out of nonattainment relative to other criteria pollutants. Another reason is that the data for
toxic releases includes both VOCs (precursors to ozone) and non-VOCs so I can separately analyze
whether nonattainment for ozone is having an effect on VOCs (which I would expect) as well as
non-VOCs (which would be unintended benefits of ozone regulation).
Table 2.1 summarizes the variation of counties that go into and out of nonattainment for three
criteria pollutants: 1-hour ozone, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and airborne particulate matter (PM10).
The identification of the empirical models comes from switches in regime (attainment status), so
ideally I would like to use the data with the most variation so I can tell if switching regimes makes
a difference in emission levels.
Table 2.1: Nonattainment county variation
1-hour Ozone PM10 SO2
Number of counties always in attainment 1217 1505 1514
Number of counties never in attainment 168 0 19
Single Change: Nonattainment to attainment 100 0 33
Single Change: Attainment to Nonattainment 35 50 0
Multiple Changes 47 12 1
Sample includes the top 50% of TRI emitting counties (1567).
From the SO2 nonattainment data, 33 counties make a switch from nonattainment to at-
tainment. These are counties that are already in nonattainment in 1988 and return to attainment
status at some point over the next 15-year period. There are no counties in attainment in 1988
that make a single switch to nonattainment. There is only one county that makes multiple switches
(nonattainment to attainment and back to nonattainment). Therefore there is not much variation
to exploit using the SO2 nonattainment data.
PM10 was initially regulated in 1991 as a result of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
On July 1, 1987, the EPA revised the NAAQS for particulate matter, replacing total suspended
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particulates (TSPs) as the indicator for particulate matter with a new indicator that included only
those particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers in diameter. The switch in standards came
from the recognition that particulate matter smaller than 10 micrometers in diameter posed more
of a health risk than the larger particles. The standard was again updated in 1997 to focus on
PM2.5 which is particulate matter smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter.
For particulate matter between 1988-2002, 50 counties had a single change from attainment
to nonattainment (see Table 2.1). All of these switches occur in 1991 as a result of the change
in standards for particulate matter. There are no counties that make a single switch from nonat-
tainment to attainment since there were no counties in nonattainment in 1988 because the PM10
standard was not in effect yet. Those counties that experience multiple changes are the ones that
made it back into attainment after the initial switch in 1991. Because of this common switch in
the PM10 nonattainment data, there is much less variation across counties than Table 2.1 would
suggest. Even though this uniform switch could be useful in a statistical sense to examine the effect
that differences in regime have on toxic emissions, I choose not to use PM10 because there are only
62 counties that make any kind of a switch.
For this chapter I use nonattainment for 1-hour ozone, because of all the criteria pollutants
it has the most variation. There are counties that switch into attainment, out of attainment, and
counties that experience multiple switches. There are 182 counties from the sample that make
some kind of switch in regime. There are also no changes in standards for 1-hour ozone between
the years 1988-2002.
Congress established the Toxics Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)5 , and later expanded it in the Pollution Prevention
Act of 19906 . EPCRA Section 313 requires EPA and the States to collect data annually on releases
and transfers of certain toxic chemicals from industrial facilities and make the data available to the
public through the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI database can be obtained directly
5 42 USC §116
6 42 USC §133
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from the EPA. The data for this research were retrieved using the EPA’s Risk Screening and En-
vironmental Indicators (RSEI) program version 2.1.2 (August 2004) [1]. This database contains
data on point source (stack), fugitive, and direct water emissions as well as off-site transfer of
toxic pollutants. Total pounds of emissions are reported, but the data also include hazard and
risk scores. Hazard scores are constructed by multiplying the pounds released by the chemicals’
toxicity weight. Risk-based scores combine the surrogate dose with toxicity weight and population
estimates. The temporal coverage of this data ranges from 1988 to 2002 and is available at the
facility level. For the purpose of this research, I use only the pounds of stack air emissions and
I aggregate to the county level. The number of TRI reporting facilities is provided by the RSEI
program used to obtain data on emissions.
The top ten TRI releases include hydrochloric acid, methanol, ammonia, toluene, xylene,
sulfuric acid, chlorine, carbon disulfide, methyl ethyl ketone, and dichloromethane. Six of these ten
releases are volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and are indirectly regulated through the NAAQS
for ozone. The remaining four are regulated as HAPs, but are not subject to the same federal
standards as the criteria pollutants. The top ten TRI releases make up 72% of the overall TRI
measure and the top five alone make up 51.3% of the overall measure.
Table 2.2: Top 10 TRI Releases
Chemicals % TRI Emissions Volatile Organic Compound
1. Hydrochloric Acid 17.9 No
2. Methanol 12 Yes
3. Ammonia 9 No
4. Toluene 7.2 Yes
5. Xylene 5.2 Yes
6. Sulfuric Acid 4.8 No
7. Chlorine 4.8 No
8. Carbon Disulfide 4.8 Yes
9. Methyl Ethyl Ketone 3.5 Yes
10. Dichloromethane 2.8 Yes
Top 5 51.3%
Top 10 72%
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Certain characteristics about the TRI data require that the results from this analysis be used
with caution. Any facility emitting levels above the currently established threshold are required to
report to the TRI. The data are self reported by facilities and not necessarily verified by the EPA.
There may exist an incentive for facilties to under-report their emissions and therefore the numbers
in the dataset are likely to be biased toward zero. Emission levels are sometimes calculated using
technology based engineering estimates rather than actual measurements. These measurement
errors are likely to lead to conservative estimates.
Reporting requirements have also changed over time with respect to which releases facilities
are required to report, which industries are required to report, and the thresholds for various releases
above which firms are required to report their releases. The first chemical expansion occurred
in 1993 with the addition of certain chemicals that appear on the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)7 list of hazardous wastes and certain hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) 8
to EPCRA §313. The second expansion was the addition of 286 chemicals9 and chemical categories
on November 30, 1994. The additional chemicals can be characterized as high or moderately high in
toxicity, and currently manufactured, processed or otherwise used in the United States. The top ten
TRI releases have all been tracked since the beginning of the program in 1987, however thresholds
for reporting have changed. SIC codes that have been required to report since 1987 include SIC
codes 20-39 (listed in Table 2.3). On May 1, 1997, EPA published a final rule adding seven
industry sectors to TRI10 : metal mining, coal mining, electrical utilities that combust coal and/or
oil, hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities, chemical wholesale distributors, petroleum
bulk stations and terminals, and solvent recovery services. Currently a facility must report to TRI
if it is in a specific industrial sector required to report (e.g., manufacturing, mining, electric power
generation), employs 10 or more full-time equivalent employees, and manufactures or processes over
25,000 pounds of a TRI-listed chemical or otherwise uses greater than 10,000 pounds of a listed
7 58 FR 63500
8 58 FR 63496
9 59 FR 61432
10 62 FR 23833
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chemical in a given year. According to 40 CFR §372.25, the reporting thresholds upon initiation of
TRI program focused on the largest emitters, and over the next two years reduced the thresholds
for reporting. In 1987, the threshold was 75,000 pounds of the chemical manufactured or processed
for the year. In 1988, the threshold was 50,000 pounds of the chemical manufactured or processed
for the year. 1989 and thereafter the threshold was 25,000 pounds of the chemical manufactured
or processed for the year.
Table 2.3: Manufacturing Sectors Required to Report to TRI (1988-2002)
SIC code Industrial Sector Initial Year
10 Metal Mining 1998
12 Coal Mining 1998
20 Food and Kindred Products 1987
21 Tobacco Products 1987
22 Textile Mill Products 1987
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 1987
24 Lumber and Wood Products 1987
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1987
26 Paper and Allied Products 1987
27 Printing and Publishing 1987
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 1987
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 1987
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 1987
31 Leather and Leather Products 1987
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 1987
33 Primary Metal Industries 1987
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1987
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 1987
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 1987
37 Transportation Equipment 1987
38 Instruments and Related Products 1987
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1987
4911/4931/4939 Electric Utilities 1998
4953/7389 RCRA/Solvent Recovery 1998
5169 Chemical Wholesalers 1998
The data on carbon dioxide is fossil-fuel CO2 emissions associated with cropland production
in the United States. On-site emissions refer to emissions occurring on the farm. Off-site emissions
are those that occur off the farm such as emissions from the production and transport of fertilizers
and pesticides. Also included in the off-site measure is the electricity produced that is used on
site. The measure of CO2 used here is the total of both on-site and off-site emissions. The values
are estimated (not measured) using a combination of independent survey data, established energy
consumption parameters for field scale operation budgets, and CO2 coefficients based on summation
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of individual management practices as opposed to national extrapolation estimates. The units are
megagram C for CO2 estimates. These data span the years 1990-2004 [15].
Per capita income data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis [50] and pop-
ulation density data were obtained jointly from the U.S. Census Bureau [13] and the EPA’s Risk-
Screening Environmental Indicators [1]. Both were available at the county level annually from 1988
to 2006. There are other variables I wish to obtain, but they are either available annually but
at the state level or available at the county level but for only certain years. The variables that I
would ideally like to include if available are median age, median income, racial composition, firm
concentrations, percent college graduates, percent with children, and percent elderly.
2.4 Estimation and Results
2.4.1 Model 1: TRI emissions, facilities, and per facility emissions
I use the first part of this model to estimate the effect of nonattainment status on overall
toxic releases. I construct a 15-year panel data set which includes the years 1988-2002 and includes
the top 750 TRI emitting counties, due to the large number of counties with zero emissions (743
counties) over the fifteen-year period. The dependent variable is total pounds of stack air emissions
from the TRI. The key explanatory variables are nonattainment status broken up into two measures.
The first is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the county is designated as nonattainment for
1-hour ozone (either whole or part) in year t and equals 0 otherwise. The second is the cumulative
number of years a county has been in nonattainment. This measure is used because firms that
have been in nonattainment longer will have even stricter regulations than counties that have just
entered nonattainment status. I control for population density and per capita income. I include
county fixed effects to control for factors that are specific to a county that do not change over time.
Such factors may be that some states have higher annual exposure to sunlight which is a key factor
in ozone formation. I include year fixed effects in an attempt to control for the changing of reporting
thresholds and the inclusion of additional industries required to report over time. Using an ordinary
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least squares fixed-effects framework I estimate the parameters of the following equation
TRIit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (2.1)
where TRIit represents the measure of total pounds of TRI stack air emissions in county i in year t.
Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which includes a dummy variable for whether
county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t and a variable for the cumulative
number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone. Xit is a matrix of control variables
which includes population density and per capita income. To control for year effects that affect
all counties, I include d1989t,. . . ,d2002t as dummy variables for years 1989-2002. The term γi is
the county fixed effects, which includes all factors within a given county that do not vary over
time. To remove γi, I use time demeaning which is the fixed-effects transformation model. it is
the idiosyncratic error term. The estimation results are provided in Table 2.4 under the baseline
specification.
Estimation of the baseline specification confirms the expectation that the longer a county is
in nonattainment for ozone the greater the reduction of TRI emissions since the coefficient on ‘Years
Nonattainment’ is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that for
each additional year a county is in nonattainment for ozone overall TRI emissions per county are
reduced by 22,881 pounds. Given the average emissions per county in a given year are 1,723,807
pounds, this is a modest reduction (1.3% of the average). Since TRI consists of 612 releases, it is
likely that spillover effects are present, but it is not possible to be sure because VOCs are included
in the TRI measure. It is possible that TRI emissions are declining only because of reductions of
VOCs. I examine these more closely in the second model when I disaggregate and estimate the
effects on individual releases.
A summary of the TRI data reveals that the mean of county-level TRI emissions is 1,723,807
and median level of emissions is 829,290. The maximum observed level of TRI emissions is
119,000,000. From this summary the distribution of TRI pounds of emissions is seemingly very
right skewed as shown in Figure 2.1. I re-specify the model by changing the baseline specification
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Table 2.4: Results - Effect Of Ozone Nonattainment On TRI Emissions
Baseline I II III
TRI Pounds ln(TRI Pounds) TRI Pounds ln(TRI Pounds)
Ozone nonattainment 295,989.70 0.3576258 ** 46,855.30 -0.025637
[ 166,717.30 ] [ 0.1307793 ] [ 134,250.10 ] [ 0.122415 ]
Years of ozone nonattainment -22,881.54 * -0.0161364 * -3,092.68 -0.0028827
[ 10,334.11 ] [ 0.0081065 ] [ 10,044.05 ] [ 0.0091586 ]
Per capita income -21.39821 -0.0000776 ** 53.03836 * 0.0000979 **
[ 18.13613 ] [ 0.0000142 ] [ 22.73067 ] [ 0.0000207 ]
Population density -2,633.81 ** 0.0014253 * 708.8642 0.0018964 **
[ 849.1724 ] [ 0.0006661 ] [ 810.5987 ] [ 0.0007391 ]
Constant 2,872,303 ** 15.19271 ** 1,304,974 ** 11.55458 **
[ 476,295.80 ] [ 0.3736241 ] [ 346,307.40 ] [ 0.3157779 ]
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
County time trends No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,250 11,250 11,250 11,250
R2 0.0254 0.0299 0.6895 0.5824
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
to one which uses the natural logarithm of pounds of TRI emissions as the dependent variable. I
estimate the parameters of the following equation.
ln(TRI)it = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (2.2)
The estimation results are provided in Table 2.4 under specification I. From the estimation of
Equation 2.2, the coefficient on ‘Years Nonattainment’ is negative and statistically significant at the
5% level. The coefficient estimate suggests that for each additional year a county is in nonattainment
there is a 1.6% reduction in pounds of TRI emissions.
A careful analysis of the emissions data for those counties that make a switch from either
attainment to nonattainment or nonattainment to attainment shows that a large number of counties
experience a significant deviation from the trend leading up to a switch shortly after the switch has
occurred. In an attempt to account for the effects of this break in trend after a switch, I re-specify
the model to include county-specific time trends. I estimate the parameters of the re-specified
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of County-Level TRI Emissions (Pounds)
model using both level and logged measures of TRI pounds as the dependent variable.
TRIit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + Yitρ + it (2.3)
ln(TRI)it = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + Yitρ + it (2.4)
Yit is a matrix which includes 750 county-specific time trends. The estimation results are provided
in Table 2.4 under specifications II and III. The results still suggest a negative relationship between
the number of years a county has been in nonattainment and pounds of TRI emissions when
including time trends. The coefficient estimate on ‘Years Nonattainment’ is no longer statistically
significant for either specification.
In general, the results from the estimation of the first part of the model suggest that overall
emissions are declining as a result of a tighter regulatory climate as proxied by the number of years
a county has been in nonattainment. One concern to be aware of is that due to self-reported nature
of the TRI dataset, it is possible that regulation is having an effect on reporting instead of actual
emission levels. It is possible that facilities that are close to the reporting requirement threshold
may choose not to report, which has the potential to substantially under-report overall emissions
in a county.
The objective of the second part of the model is to analyze the effect of regulatory stringency
along the extensive margin by estimating the effect of changes in nonattainment status on the
number of TRI reporting facilities per county. The panel data set is the same as above using years
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1988-2002 and the top 750 TRI emitting counties, however in this specification the dependent
variable is number of TRI reporting facilities per county. To find out whether toxic releases are
decreasing due to fewer facilities, I estimate the parameters of the following equation
Facilitiesit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (2.5)
using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects framework, where Facilitiesit represents the measure
of TRI reporting facilities in county i in year t. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables
which includes a dummy variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone
in year t and a variable for the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment
for ozone. Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes population density and per capita
income. d1989t,. . . ,d2002t are dummy variables for years 1989-2002. The term γi is the county
fixed effects term and it is the idiosyncratic error term. The estimation results are provided in
Table 2.5 under the baseline specification.
From the estimation of Equation 2.5 the number of TRI reporting facilities are declining as
a result of ozone nonattainment. The estimated coefficient on ‘Years of Nonattainment’ is negative
and significant at the 1% level. The results suggest there will be roughly one less facility for every
three years a county is in nonattainment (.32 fewer facilities for each year).
The distribution of TRI facilities is such that the median number of facilities in a county
is 7, while the mean number of facilities is 13.8. The maximum number of facilities is 486. This
suggests that the distribution of TRI facilities per county is also right skewed. Figure 2.2 shows the
distribution of both the level measure of TRI facilities and the natural logarithm of TRI facilities. I
re-specify the model by changing the baseline specification to one which uses the natural logarithm
of TRI facilities as the dependent variable. I estimate the parameters of the following equation.
ln(Facilities)it = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (2.6)
The results are provided in Table 2.5 under specification I. From the estimation of Equation 2.6,
the estimated coefficient on ‘Years Nonattainment’ is negative and significant at the 1% level
21
Table 2.5: Results - Effect of Ozone Nonattainment On TRI Facilities
Baseline I II III
TRI Facilities ln(TRI Facilities) TRI Facilities ln(TRI Facilities)
Ozone nonattainment 4.342841 ** 0.1409983 ** 0.2321296 0.0226638
[ 0.3960617 ] [ 0.0165511 ] [ 0.2852234 ] [ 0.0172298 ]
Years of ozone nonattainment -0.3283347 ** -0.0085661 ** 0.0591175 ** -0.0003802
[ 0.0245502 ] [ 0.0010259 ] [ 0.0213393 ] [ 0.0012891 ]
Per capita income -0.0005256 ** -0.0000152 ** 0.0005828 ** 0.0000153 **
[ 0.0000431 ] [ 1.80E-06 ] [ 0.0000483 ] [ 2.92E-06 ]
Population density -0.0023524 0.0001287 0.0155285 ** 0.0005282 **
[ 0.0020173 ] [ 0.0000843 ] [ 0.0017222 ] [ 0.000104 ]
Constant 28.21479 ** 2.582038 ** 2.618829 ** 1.754655 **
[ 1.131511 ] [ 0.0472849 ] [ 0.7357534 ] [ 0.0444455 ]
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
County time trends No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,250 11,250 11,250 11,250
R2 0.0774 0.06 0.7649 0.4995
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
and suggests that for every additional year a county is in nonattainment, the number of facilities
decreases by 0.85%. As an additional test, I again include time trends to take into account any
breaks in trend after a switch in nonattainment status. I estimate the parameters of the re-specified
model using both level and logged measures of TRI pounds as the dependent variable.
Facilitiesit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + Yitρ + it (2.7)
ln(Facilities)it = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + Yitρ + it (2.8)
Yit is a matrix oontaining 750 county-specific time trends. The estimation results are provided in
Table 2.5 under specifications II and III.
The number of facilities in nonattainment counties could be declining for three different
reasons. First, facilities could shut down because of greater regulatory stringency. Second, facilities
could exit the county and relocate in a county with lower regulatory stringency. Third, the facilities
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of TRI Facilities
may no longer be reporting any TRI emissions because they have dropped below the threshold above
which reporting is required. For the third case to be true, given that reporting thresholds have been
lowered over time, per facility emissions should be declining. A decline in per facility emissions
would be the desired effect, where simply relocating facilities would be a redistribution effect and
not lead to an overall reduction in emissions.
The objective of the third part of the model is to analyze the effect of regulatory stringency
along the intensive margin by estimating the effect of changes in nonattainment status on TRI
emissions per facility. The panel data set is the same as above using years 1988-2002 and the top
750 TRI emitting counties, however in this specification the dependent variables are number of TRI
reporting facilities per county. To find out whether toxic releases are decreasing due to lower per
facility emissions, I estimate the parameters of the following equation(
Emissions
Facility
)
it
= α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (2.9)
using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects framework, where
(
Emissions
Facility
)
it
is per-facility emissions
in county i in year t. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which includes a dummy
variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t and a variable for
the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone. Xit is a matrix
of control variables which includes population density and per capita income. d1989t,. . . ,d2002t
are dummy variables for years 1989-2002. The term γi is the county fixed effects term and it is
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the idiosyncratic error term. The estimation results are provided in Table 2.6 under the baseline
specification.
Table 2.6: Results - Effect Of Ozone Nonattainment On Per Facility TRI Emissions
Baseline I II III
TRI/Fac ln(TRI/Fac) TRI/Fac ln(TRI/Fac)
Ozone nonattainment 22,827.93 0.1907996 -12,437.97 -0.0578584
[ 71,872.04 ] [ 0.1267743 ] [ 82,467.69 ] [ 0.1192821 ]
Years of ozone nonattainment 169.5844 -0.0064942 1,656.07 -0.0024157
[ 4,455.05 ] [ 0.0078582 ] [ 6,169.90 ] [ 0.0089242 ]
Per capita income 8.809753 -0.0000623 ** 20.65682 0.0000837 **
[ 7.818508 ] [ 0.0000138 ] [ 13.96308 ] [ 0.0000202 ]
Population density 259.7924 0.0013455 * 167.8011 0.0014002
[ 366.0793 ] [ 0.0006457 ] [ 497.9378 ] [ 0.0007202 ]
Constant 64,796.41 12.77874 ** 41662.55 9.984105 **
[ 205,331.70 ] [ 0.3621823 ] [ 212,731.10 ] [ 0.3076964 ]
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
County time trends No No Yes Yes
Observations 11,250 11,250 11,250 11,250
R2 0.0049 0.0252 0.3563 0.576
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
From the estimation of the third specification, the lack of statistical significance suggests
that nonattainment has almost no effect on per facility TRI emissions. It appears that firm exodus
is the cause of the reduced emissions. Re-specifying the model to include the natural log of the
dependent variable, county-specific time trends, or both (results shown in Table 2.6 under specifi-
cations I-III) also fails to show a statistically significant relationship between the number of years a
county has been in nonattainment and per facility TRI emissions. The relationship between ‘Years
Nonattainment’ is positive when using level measures of per facility emissions, but becomes nega-
tive when using the logged measure. Based on these results, it seems plausible that facilities are not
simply reporting fewer emissions which would allow them to drop below the reporting threshold.
If a facility were right at the threshold at which a marginal decrease in the amount of emissions
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reported would cause the number of facilities to decrease, the change in overall emissions would
be negligible, which is not what the results from Table 2.4 would suggest. It seems reasonable to
conclude that facilities are decreasing because they either shut down or relocate because of a tighter
regulatory climate. This conclusion is consistent with many of the studies on firm location decisions
which find that strict environmental regulation leads firms to locate in or shift production to less
stringent counties. Unfortunately, given the data only offers a count of TRI reporting facilities, it
is not possible to know whether the facilities simply shut down or whether they relocated.
2.4.2 Model 2: NAAQS and non-NAAQS effects
I use this model to differentiate between the effects of nonattainment status on VOCs and
non-VOCs. The top ten TRI releases include hydrochloric acid, methanol, ammonia, toluene,
xylene, sulfuric acid, chlorine, carbon disulfide, methyl ethyl ketone, and dichloromethane. Six of
these ten releases are volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and are indirectly regulated through the
NAAQS for ozone. The remaining four are regulated as HAPs, but are not subject to the same
federal standards as the criteria pollutants. All of the top ten releases have been tracked by TRI
since 1987. Only the reporting requirement thresholds and which industries are required to report
have changed over time.
I construct a 15-year panel data set which includes the years 1988-2002 and includes the
top fifty percent of TRI emitting counties. The dependent variables are each of the top ten TRI
stack air releases from the TRI. The explanatory variables are nonattainment status for ozone and
cumulative number of years a county has been in nonattainment. I control for population density
and per capita income. I include year fixed effects to control for the changing of reporting thresholds
because the changing of reporting thresholds will affect all counties in the same way.
To differentiate between the effects on VOCs and non-VOCs I estimate the parameters of the
following equation for each of the top ten TRI releases using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects
framework.
IndividualTRIjit = αj + Nonattainitφj + Xitβj + δj1d1989t + . . .+ δj14d2002t + γi + jit (2.10)
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IndividualTRIjit is pounds of individual toxic release j for county i in year t, where j represents
each of the top ten TRI releases. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which
includes a dummy variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t
and a variable for the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone.
Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes population density and per capita income.
d1989t,. . . ,d2002t are dummy variables for years 1989-2002. The term γi is the county fixed effects
term and it is the idiosyncratic error term.
Estimation of the first model shows that TRI emissions are declining as a result of ozone
nonattainment. Using this second model, I test whether ozone nonattainment only affects VOCs
included in the TRI or if other releases are affected as well. Of the top five TRI releases three
are VOCs and six of the top ten releases in the TRI are VOCs. The top ten are hydrochloric
acid, methanol, ammonia, toluene, and xylene, sulfuric acid, chlorine, carbon disulfide, methyl
ethyl ketone, and dichloromethane. These ten releases are all regulated, but methanol, toluene,
xylene, carbon disulfide, methyl ethyl ketone, and dichloromethane are VOCs which are indirectly
regulated for ozone under the NAAQS. Hydrochloric acid, ammonia, sulfuric acid, and chlorine are
regulated, but not under the same federal standard as ozone. Only the results of the estimation of
the top five are reported in Table 2.7. I simply mention results of the remaining five.
Estimation of the fixed-effects model for each of the top ten TRI releases reveals that emissions
of non-VOCs are declining as a result of ozone nonattainment with the exception of chlorine. There
is a significant reduction of hydrochloric acid which makes up the largest percentage (17.9%) of
aggregate TRI releases. Ammonia, the third largest percentage (9%), is also significantly reduced as
a result of nonattainment. An additional year of ozone nonattainment is associated with a 19,234
pound reduction of hydrochloric acid and a 31,448 pound reduction of ammonia. The average
of emissions of hydrochloric acid and ammonia are 270,837 and 203,501 pounds respectively. A
change of 19,234 pounds of hydrochloric acid is 7.1% of the average and a change of 31,448 pounds
of ammonia is 15.5% of the average, which is a fairly substantial reduction. Sulfuric acid decreases
with additional years on nonattainment, however is not statistically significant. This is evidence
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Table 2.7: Results - Effect of Ozone Nonattainment On Top 10 Individual TRI Releases
Hydrochloric Methanol Ammonia Toluene Xylene
Acid (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds)
VOC VOC VOC
Nonattainment for Ozone 283,925.6* -6,806.946 646,118.6** -7,776.762 -124,720.6**
[111,986] [34,733.35] [65,156.09] [26,466.83] [28,439.36]
Years of Ozone nonattainment -19,234.73** -8,064.645** -31,448.09** -7,266.497** -503.488
[7,113.375] [2,206.27] [4,138.73] [1,681.179] [1,806.474]
Per capita Income -9.055343 4.428319 1.661112 -2.533499 3.948436
[10.626] [3.295739] [6.182458] [2.511355] [2.698522]
Population Density -517.143 58.68236 644.4223* -137.7969 4.334822
[458.0508] [142.0681] [266.5047] [108.256] [116.3241]
Constant 557,032** 258,426.2** 69,589.83 298,447.3** 91,644*
[163,188.4] [50,614.17] [94,946.84] [38,568.04] [41,442.44]
Observations 23,505 23,505 23,505 23,505 23,505
R2 0.0059 0.0018 0.0131 0.0052 0.0032
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
of spillovers since these non-VOCs are not regulated under the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards. VOCs are indirectly regulated under the NAAQS and those VOCs examined here, with
the exception of carbon disulfide, are lower as expected as a result of ozone nonattainment because
they are precursors to ozone formation.
2.4.3 Model 3: Unregulated greenhouse gas emissions
As an additional test for spillover effects from the enforcement of the NAAQS, I use this model
to estimate the effect of ozone nonattainment on the unregulated greenhouse gas carbon dioxide,
specifically carbon dioxide from cropland production. Under-reporting of carbon dioxide measures
is not as much of a concern with this dataset since they are not measured, but rather estimated.
There will still be some error in the estimation of the data, but it is a consistent calculation
procedure (see Nelson et al. [48] for details). I construct a panel data set using all counties and the
years 1990-2002. To find out the effect that ozone nonattainment has on unregulated greenhouse
gases, I estimate parameters for the following equation
CarbonDioxideit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1991t + . . .+ δ12d2002t + γi + it (2.11)
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where CarbonDioxideit represents megagrams or metric tons of carbon from cropland production
in county i in year t. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which includes a dummy
variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t and a variable for
the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone. Xit is a matrix
of control variables which includes population density and per capita income. To control for year
effects that affect all counties, I include d1991t,. . . ,d2002t as dummy variables for years 1991-2002.
The term γi is the county fixed effects, which includes all factors within a given county that do
not vary over time. To remove γi, I use time demeaning which is the fixed-effects transformation
model. it is the idiosyncratic error term. The results from parameter estimation are summarized
in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Results - Effect of Ozone Nonattainment On Cropland Carbon Dioxide
Carbon Dioxide from Cropland Production
(Megagram C)
Nonattainment for Ozone 627.085**
[71.48741]
Years of Ozone nonattainment -24.09921**
[4.47217]
Per capita Income -.0049505
[.0043196]
Population Density -.5547635*
[.2225101]
Constant 7,113.848**
[69.85546]
Observations 40,703
R2 0.0243
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The coefficient on ‘Years of Nonattainment’ is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level which implies that an additional year of ozone nonattainment leads to a 24 megagram
reduction of carbon dioxide from cropland production. However, with a mean emissions level of
7,178 megagrams, this change, which is 0.3% of the average, seems to be only a very modest
reduction. Ozone nonattainment not only has a significant negative effect on toxic releases (both
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VOCs and non-VOCs), but also leads to lower unregulated greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon
dioxide.
2.5 Conclusion
The results provide support for the existence of spillovers as evidenced by the reduction of
non-VOC emissions associated with nonattainment status of 1-hour ozone. The reduction of overall
TRI emissions is caused by reductions of both VOCs and non-VOCs. Since the number of TRI
reporting facilities is decreasing and there is a lack of a statistically significant relationship between
ozone nonattainment and pounds of emissions per facility, it seems reasonable to conclude that
the exodus of facilities is the primary reason for decreased emissions. Since the TRI reports a
count of facilities in a county, it is important to recognize that declining facility numbers does not
necessarily mean that facilities shut down or moved to a new county. If facility numbers decrease, it
is possible that emission levels at some facilities dropped below the required threshold for reporting,
thereby causing the number of facilities to drop. However, given the results found in this work,
that explanation seems unlikely. The reduction of unregulated carbon dioxide emissions associated
with cropland production due to ozone nonattainment is further evidence of spillover effects.
To the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to address these air quality regulatory
spillovers and thus report such findings. Important implications of these findings would be that not
accounting for these spillovers could lead policy-makers to significantly underestimate the potential
benefits (in terms of reduced pollution levels) associated with the NAAQS. Also this analysis pro-
vides additional credibility for the use of nonattainment status as a proxy for regulatory stringency.
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Table 2.9: Summary Statistics
Top 750 Emitting Counties (1988-2002)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TRI pounds (stack air) 11,250 1,723,807 3,775,368 0 1.19e+08
TRI reporting facilities 11,250 13.849 24.953 0 486
Per facility emissions 11,250 322,987.8 1,348,453 0 6.50e+07
Years of nonattainment for ozone 11,250 3.795 7.285 0 25
Nonattainment for ozone 11,250 .2426667 .4287142 0 1
Per capita income 11,250 20,805.19 5,858.492 7677 61759
Population density 11,250 189.7784 602.6435 0 13582
Top 50% of Emitting Counties (1988-2002)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hydrochoric Acid 23,505 270,837 2,185,927 0 1.53e+08
Ammonia 23,505 203,501.4 1,482,101 0 6.03e+07
Toluene 23,505 185,820 680,646.2 0 2.70e+07
Methanol 23,505 297,848.2 1,221,581 0 3.08e+07
Xylene 23,505 133,017.2 694,400.7 0 4.86e+07
Dichloromethane 23,505 56,019.37 310,548.4 0 1.05e+07
Carbon disulfide 23,505 45,282.74 977,027.9 0 4.62e+07
Methyl ehtyl ketone 23,505 91,752.37 385,377.6 0 1.82e+07
Chlorine 23,505 46,947.11 1,652,505 0 1.10e+08
Sulfuric acid 23,505 248,979.8 4,077,513 0 2.57e+08
Years of nonattainment for ozone 23,505 2.66237 6.332302 0 25
Nonattainment for ozone 23,505 .1732823 .3784992 0 1
Per capita income 23,505 19,923.31 5,601.505 7380 61759
Population density 23,505 132.4999 555.7981 0 13582
All Counties (1990-2002)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cropland CO2 (Megagrams) 40,703 7,178.088 8,246.035 0 70,678.95
Years of nonattainment for ozone 40,703 1.62192 5.20538 0 25
Per capita income 40,703 19,620.89 5,554.011 0 85,984
Population density 40,703 87.87008 562.2077 0 21,354
Nonattainment for ozone 40,703 .1032602 .3043022 0 1
Chapter 3
The Effects of Ozone Regulation On Unregulated Industrial Carbon Dioxide
Emissions
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon
dioxide, fit the definition of air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA)1 , and required the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine whether or not greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles present a danger to public health. On December 7, 2009, the EPA issued
an endangerment finding and a cause and contribute finding regarding greenhouse gases for mobile
sources under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. The endangerment finding stated that current
and projected concentrations of the six primary well-mixed greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) in the atmosphere threaten the public health and welfare of current and
future generations. The cause and contribute finding stated that the combined emissions of these
well-mixed greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to
the greenhouse gas pollution which threatens public health and welfare. On December 15, 2009, the
final findings were published in the Federal Register2 and the final rule became effective January
14, 20103 .
The regulation of CO2 from mobile sources also prompted the EPA to consider regulation of
stationary sources of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. On January 2nd, 2011, the largest
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
2 Docket ID [EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171; FRL-9091-8]
3 http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html
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stationary sources of carbon dioxide emissions were required to obtain construction permits (New
Source Review) for any new sources or for any major modifications to existing facilities. Operating
permits (Title V) will be required of these sources beginning July 1, 2011. The EPA is currently
in the process of setting guidelines for New Source Performance Standards for carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases for natural gas, oil and coal-fired energy generating units. Based on a recent
signing agreement, the EPA is committed to issuing proposed regulation by July 26, 2011.
Previous studies have made a link between nonattainment status for criteria pollutants sub-
ject to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards of the Clean Air Act and emission levels for
those specific pollutants. This research expands on previous findings of regulatory spillover effects
and analyzes the effect of ozone regulation on industrial releases of carbon dioxide before green-
house gases were regulated. The results suggest that some spillover effects from the regulation of
ozone exist which lead to a slight reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, but most importantly a
reduction in per facility emissions. This is likely due to updating production methods or installing
new technology, which reduces emissions of a wide range of pollutants. These results are significant
because they show that it may not be necessary to directly regulate every pollutant.
3.1 Air Quality Regulation Background
The Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 is the law detailed in the United States Code under Air
Pollution Prevention and Control (Title 42, Chapter 85)4 . The enforcement of the Clean Air Act is
detailed under Title 40 of the Federal Code of Regulation: Protection of Environment (administered
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency). The CAA regulatory programs proceed
as follows. First the EPA identifies emissions of a pollutant from a set of sources: stationary5 and
mobile6 . Then the EPA undertakes an analysis of whether these emissions present a danger to the
public health or welfare and, if it is the case, issues an endangerment finding. An endangerment
4 Titles in the Clean Air Act correspond to subchapters in the U.S. Code.
5 Stationary sources include electric generating units (EGUs), large industrial boilers, pulp and paper, cement,
iron and steel industry, refineries, nitric acid plants.
6 Mobile sources include airplanes, automobiles, lawn and garden equipment, locomotives, marine engines, motor-
cycles, trucks and buses.
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finding is a necessary and sufficient condition for regulation. Once an endangerment finding has
been issued, the EPA cannot refuse to regulate although they retain some discretion over how to
regulate.
The regulation of stationary sources of emissions is broken down into three different forms:
air quality standards, technology standards, and permit programs for new and modified sources.
The citations of laws governing these three types of regulations are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of Stationary Source Regulation - Laws and Implementation
Law Implementation
United States Code Clean Air Act Code of Federal Regulations
Air Quality Standards:
National Ambient Air Quality Standards 42 USC §7408-7410 CAA §108-110 40 CFR §50
- State Implementation Plans 42 USC §7410,7502 CAA §110,172 40 CFR §51-52
Technology Standards:
New Source Performance Standards 42 USC §7411 CAA §111 40 CFR §60
Hazardous Air Pollutants 42 USC §7412 CAA §112 40 CFR §61,63
Permit Programs:
New Source Review (Construction) 42 USC §7470-7479,7503 CAA §160-169,173 40 CFR §51-52
- PSD 42 USC §7470-7479 CAA §160-169 40 CFR §52
- NAA 42 USC §7503 CAA §173 40 CFR §51
Title V (Operating) 42 USC §7661a-7661f CAA §501-506 40 CFR §70-71
3.1.1 Air Quality Standards
3.1.1.1 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
The regulatory process of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards begins with the EPA
determining whether a given pollutant endangers public health or welfare. Those pollutants which
have been determined to endanger public health or welfare are then listed as criteria pollutants. The
EPA has identified the following six pollutants as criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ozone
(O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5), and lead
(Pb). A measure of TSPs (or total suspended particulates) was used for particulate matter until
1991. The agency must then determine what air quality standard is necessary to protect public
health (primary standard) and welfare (secondary standard). Title 40 of the Code of Federal
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Regulations lists the maximum allowable concentrations for each of the six criteria pollutants. The
EPA has oversight, but the states are responsible for compliance in what is referred to as cooperative
federalism.
Every year counties in violation of these standards are designated as nonattainment counties.
The standard for 1-hour ozone under the NAAQS is as long as the highest hourly reading does not
exceed 0.12 parts per million (ppm) on more than one day per year in a county, then that county
is in attainment. The standard can also be described as the second-highest daily maximum or the
single-highest hourly reading over all hours and days of the year, except for the first day with the
highest annual hourly reading. For counties designated as nonattainment, the state must formulate
a state implementation plan outlining how they plan to return any nonattainment counties back
to attainment status.
3.1.1.2 State Implementation Plans (SIP)
The goal of NAAQS regulation is to ensure that areas which fail to attain these standards
are brought back into compliance and that those areas currently meeting standards continue to do
so in the future. State Implementation Plans7 are the regulations and other materials for meeting
clean air standards and associated Clean Air Act requirements. SIPs include state regulations that
EPA has approved; state-issued, EPA-approved orders requiring pollution control at individual
companies; planning documents such as area-specific compilations of emissions estimates and com-
puter simulations (modeling analyses) demonstrating that the regulatory limits assure that the air
will meet air quality standards, and federally promulgated regulations, designated as FIP (federal
implementation plan). Each state must illustrate how an area will come into compliance with pri-
mary (health) standards8 within five years. In nonattainment areas, states are required to impose
reasonably available control technology9 (RACT) on emitters. States that fail to adequately plan
are subject to sanctions,10 including potential loss of federal highway funding.
7 http://www.epa.gov/reg5oair/sips/
8 CAA §110
9 CAA §172
10 CAA §179
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3.1.2 Technology Standards
3.1.2.1 New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)
New Source Performance Standards11 are national emission standards that are progressively
tightened over time to achieve a steady rate of air quality improvement without unreasonable eco-
nomic disruption. The NSPS imposes uniform requirements on new and modified sources through
the nation. It could be a numerical emission limit, a design standard, an equipment standard, or a
work practice standard. These standards are based on the best demonstrated technology (BDT).
Any new source of air pollution must install the best control system currently in use within that
industry. Standards typically need to be reviewed and possibly updated about every eight years.
Primary enforcement responsibility of the NSPS rests with EPA, but this authority can be
delegated to the states. States can adopt an NSPS or impose limitations of their own as long as the
state requirements are as stringent as the federal requirements. The states have to be certain that
any new source will not adversely affect their SIP. For this reason all new sources must undergo a
review process known as the New Source Review.
3.1.2.2 Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)
In addition to the NAAQS criteria pollutants, the EPA and local environmental agencies
monitor and regulate a wide range of other pollutants often referred to as hazardous air pollutants12
(HAPs) under section 112 of the CAA. The CAA of 1970 required the EPA to identify and list all
air pollutants (not already identified as criteria pollutants) that may reasonably be anticipated to
result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible
illness. For each pollutant identified13 , the EPA was to then establish national emissions standards
for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) at levels that would ensure the protection of the public
11 http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/apc4c.html
12 http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/apc4e.html
13 The current list includes 188 compounds. Examples of toxic air pollutants include benzene, which is found in
gasoline; perchlorethlyene, which is emitted from some dry cleaning facilities; and methylene chloride, which is used
as a solvent and paint stripper by a number of industries. Examples of other listed air toxics include dioxin, asbestos,
toluene, and metals such as cadmium, mercury, chromium, and lead compounds. The majority of the HAPs are
volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
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health. They found it very difficult to establish these standards because of the uncertainty in
assessing health risk.
In the first phase of the HAPs program, the CAA defines two types of emissions standards:
maximum achievable control technologies (MACTs) and generally available control technologies
(GACTs). MACTs14 are emission standards that achieve “the maximum degree of reduction in
emissions of the hazardous air pollutants” taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emis-
sion reduction, and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.
GACTs are less stringent emission standards based on the use of more standard technologies and
work practices. In the second phase of the HAPs program, the EPA has to assess and report on
the residual risk due to HAPs that is likely to remain after attainment of the MACT and GACT
standards. Based on this assessment, EPA may implement additional standards to address any
significant remaining, or residual, health or environmental risks.
3.1.3 Permit Programs
The process of permitting for new or modified sources takes two forms: construction permits
and operating permits. Constructions permits are referred to as New Source Review Permits.
NSR permits are broken down into two subcategories: PSD permits which are specific to sources in
attainment areas and NAA permits which are specific to sources in nonattainment areas. Operating
permits are referred to as Title V permits and are either state/locally-issued or EPA-issued.
3.1.3.1 New Source Review (NSR) - Construction Permits
The New Source Review15 (NSR) permitting program established as part of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments is a construction permitting program. NSR permits are legal documents
that specify what construction is allowed, what emission limits must be met, and often how the
emissions source must be operated. The primary objective of these permits is to ensure that air
14 MACT is determined differently for new and existing sources of HAPs. For new sources, MACT is equivalent to
the best controlled similar source in a given industry. For existing sources, MACT represents the average emission
limit achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing sources for which EPA has information.
15 http://www.epa.gov/NSR/
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quality is not significantly degraded by adding new factories and modifying existing facilities such
as power plants. In areas with clean air, NSR assures that new emissions do not significantly
worsen air quality, where in areas with poor air quality, such as nonattainment areas, NSR assures
that allowing new emissions from new sources or modifications does not prevent progress toward
improving air quality. They also want to make sure that advances in pollution control do not
significantly prevent industrial expansion.
Prevention of Significant Deterioration16 (PSD) is the NSR permitting program that applies
to new sources or modifications that occur within attainment areas or areas which are unclassifiable
with the NAAQS. The purpose of PSD permits is to protect public health and welfare; preserve
or enhance air quality in areas of special national or regional interest such as natural, recreational,
scenic, or historic sites; guarantee that economic growth is consistent with maintaining clean air
quality; and assure that any decision to permit increased air pollution is made only after careful
evaluation of all the consequences and involves public participation in the decision making process.
It requires the installation of the “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT), an air quality
analysis, an additional impacts analysis, and public involvement. BACT is an emissions limitation
which is based on the maximum degree of control that can be achieved. This includes fuel cleaning
or treatment and innovative fuel combustion techniques. BACT may be a design, equipment, work
practice, or operational standard if imposition of an emissions standard is infeasible.
Nonattainment (NAA) NSR17 is the permitting program that applies to new sources or
modifications at existing facilities located specifically in nonattainment areas. The requirements
are customized for the nonattainment area. All nonattainment NSR programs require the lowest
achievable emission rate (LAER), emission offsets, and opportunity for public involvement. LAER
is either the most stringent emission limitation contained in the implementation plan of any state
or the most stringent emission limitation achieved in practice. Offsets are emission reductions
that must offset the emissions increase from the new source or modification and provide a net
16 http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html
17 http://www.epa.gov/NSR/naa.html
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improvement in air quality. The purpose for offsets is to allow a nonattainment area to move
towards attainment of the NAAQS while still allowing some industrial growth.
3.1.3.2 Title V - Operating Permits
Title V permits18 are required by most large sources and some smaller sources for operation.
Permitting authorities issue these legally enforceable operating permits to different air pollution
sources once operation has started19 . Title V permits are typically issued by state and local
permitting authorities and are referred to as part 70 permits because the corresponding regulations
are found in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations under part 70. EPA-issued permits are
referred to as part 71 permits.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Results from chapter 2 suggest evidence of spillover effects from the enforcement of the
NAAQS for ozone on both VOCs and non-VOCs, both of which are regulated. In this chapter,
I analyze whether ozone nonattainment has an effect on industrial stationary sources of carbon
dioxide. CO2 was unregulated before just recently, with the exception of the reporting requirements
under the Acid Rain Program.
The Acid Rain Program20 (ARP) instituted a system of continuous emissions monitoring21
(CEM) to ensure that the mandated reductions of SO2 and NOx are achieved. CEM is the
continuous measurement of pollutants specifically related to the formation of acid rain, which are
released through industrial processes in the form of exhaust gases from combustion. The ARP
requires the continuous monitoring of SO2, NOx, volumetric flow, and diluent gas
22 . Under this
program, CO2 monitoring and estimation procedures are detailed as well.
18 CAA §501-507; 42 USC §7661-7661f
19 http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/permits/
20 CAA §401-416
21 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html
22 A gas of known quality introduced for analytical purposes so that it quantitatively lowers the concentration of
the components of a gaseous sample; this may also be the complementary gas. [IUPAC Compendium of Chemical
Terminology, 2nd Edition (1997)]
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Since NOx is monitored by the ARP and is also a precursor to ozone, if a county is in
nonattainment for ozone, local regulators will be imposing stricter enforcement in order to reduce
NOx and VOCs and bring the county back into attainment. If better technology is installed, this
may reduce other emissions besides NOx and VOCs such as CO2. County-level carbon dioxide
could also be reduced by firms leaving the county.
The intended consequence of air quality regulation is to reduce emissions below an acceptable
safety threshold nationwide which translates into lower emissions per facility. It is very conceivable
that facilities would leave counties with strict regulation, which would lower emissions in nonat-
tainment counties, but increase emissions in attainment counties where regulation is relatively less
stringent. This case would not necessarily result in a net reduction of emissions, but rather a redis-
tribution of emissions. If facility numbers are increasing, but emissions per facility are decreasing,
then firms are emitting less and that is the primary factor causing the reduced emissions. Cleaner
facilities entering the county is a possible story consistent with this scenario. The first set of es-
timations of this chapter tests whether there are lower overall emissions in ozone nonattainment
counties and the second set of estimations tests whether lower overall emissions are due to fewer
facilities or lower emissions per facility.
3.3 Data
The industrial carbon dioxide emissions data come from the Clean Air Markets Division23
(CAMD) of the EPA. The data were extracted at the facility level and then aggregated to the
county level. The data are available from 1995-2008. The Part 75 Continuous Emissions Monitoring
Rule24 provides details about applicability and reporting requirements for industrial facilities to
report carbon dioxide. The rule was originally published in January 1993 and established continuous
emission monitoring (CEM) and reporting requirements under EPAs Acid Rain Program25 (ARP).
The ARP regulates electric generating units (EGUs) that burn fossil fuels such as coal, oil and
23 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
24 40 CFR §75.2,75.10,75.13
25 CAA §410-416
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natural gas and that serve a generator greater than 25 megawatts. For these units Part 75 requires
continuous monitoring and reporting of sulfur dioxide (SO2) mass emissions, carbon dioxide (CO2)
mass emissions, nitrogen oxides (NOX) emission rate, and heat input
26 .
Figure 3.1: National Trend of Industrial Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reported
The data for county nonattainment status is publicly available through the EPA’s website [2].
Beginning in 1978 to 2009, every July counties are listed if they are designated as nonattainment
(either the whole county or part of the county) for one of the criteria pollutants. Attainment status
is used as a proxy for regulatory stringency, because new and existing plants are subject to much
stricter controls in nonattainment areas, relative to attainment areas. Counties in nonattainment
are more likely to be closely monitored and subject to greater enforcement efforts. The research
in this chapter focuses on the effect of nonattainment status for 1-hour and 8-hour ozone because
there is greater variation of counties moving in and out of nonattainment relative to other criteria
pollutants.
The data have 1-hour and 8-hour ozone nonattainment listed separately. There are counties
listed as nonattainment for 1-hour ozone up until 2004. There are no counties listed as being in
nonattainment for 8-hour ozone before 2004. Only a one-year overlap of these two standards exists.
In 2004, there are 214 counties that are listed as nonattainment for both 1-hour and 8-hour ozone.
For the purpose of this analysis, I define nonattainment status for ozone as being out of attainment
26 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/docs/plain english guide part75 rule.pdf
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Figure 3.2: National Trend of Per Facility Industrial Carbon Dioxide
for either the 1-hour standard or the 8-hour standard. Combining these two standards I create an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the county is out of attainment for either standard and equals
0 otherwise. From this I construct a variable for the cumulative number of years since the county
was last in attainment (for both standards) for ozone.
3.4 Empirical Specifications
The primary objective of the empirical model is to examine what effect ozone nonattainment
has on unregulated industrial CO2 emissions. If CO2 emissions are declining in ozone nonattainment
counties, the second objective of the model is then to identify whether it is due to facilities leaving
the county or shutting down because of increased regulatory stringency (extensive margin) or
whether firms reduce their emissions by decreasing production or installing or upgrading abatement
technology because of increased regulatory stringency (intensive margin).
The advantage of panel data is that time-invariant variables can be time demeaned using a
fixed effects model, which greatly reduces the required number of variables for estimation, while not
leading to omitted variable bias. With the movement of people in the U.S. to the sunbelt states,
it would be expected that there would be increased levels of ozone. By including fixed effects, I
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control for areas with high annual levels of sunshine which is key for ozone formation, but does
not change from year to year. The increased population numbers are controlled for by including a
measure of population density.
Ozone nonattainment in the current year is expected to be associated with higher levels of
overall emissions, because higher emissions are the reason that the county is out of attainment. A
negative relationship between cumulative number of years a county has been out of attainment and
the levels of emissions in the county is the hypothesized result. The underlying reasoning is that
counties that are not making progress toward returning to attainment will draw more attention
and subsequently stricter enforcement.
The first objective of the empirical model is to estimate the effect of ozone regulation on
unregulated industrial carbon dioxide. I construct a 12-year panel data set which includes the years
1995-2006. The dependent variable is total tons of county-level industrial CO2 emissions. The key
explanatory variable is the cumulative number of years a county has been in nonattainment for
ozone. Using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects framework, I estimate the parameters of the
following equation
(IndustCO2)it = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1996t + . . .+ δ11d2006t + γi + it (3.1)
where IndustCO2 represents the measure of total tons of industrial carbon dioxide emissions in
county i in year t. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which includes a dummy
variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t and a variable for
the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone. Xit is a matrix
of control variables which includes population density and per capita income. To control for year
effects that affect all counties, I include d1996t,. . . ,d2006t as dummy variables for years 1996-2006.
The term γi is the county fixed effects, which includes all factors within a given county that do
not vary over time. To remove γi, I use time demeaning which is the fixed-effects transformation
model. it is the idiosyncratic error term.
The second objective of the empirical model is to decompose the effects of ozone nonattain-
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ment on carbon dioxide at the extensive and intensive margins. The extensive margin is the effect
of ozone regulation on the number of industrial facilities reporting carbon dioxide. The intensive
margin is the effect of ozone regulation on per facility emissions. For this part of the model, I
combine two specifications in which the dependent variables are number of facilities reporting CO2
and the tons of CO2 emissions per facility. The panel data set is the same as above using years
1995-2006. To estimate the extensive and intensive marginal effects, I obtain parameter estimates
of the following equations using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects framework.
Facilitiesit = α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1996t + . . .+ δ11d2006t + γi + it (3.2)(
IndustCO2
Facility
)
it
= α+ Nonattainitφ + Xitβ + δ1d1996t + . . .+ δ11d2006t + γi + it (3.3)
Facilitiesit is a count of the number of industrial facilities reporting carbon dioxide emissions in
county i in year t.
(
IndustCO2
Facility
)
it
is a measure of the per facility industrial carbon dioxide emissions
reported in county i in year t. Nonattainit is a matrix of nonattainment variables which includes
a dummy variable for whether county i is designated as nonattainment for ozone in year t and
a variable for the cumulative number of years since county i was last in attainment for ozone.
Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes population density and per capita income.
d1996t,. . . ,d2006t are dummy variables for years 1996-2006. The term γi is the county fixed effects
term and it is the idiosyncratic error term.
3.5 Results
Estimation results for the panel including all U.S. counties are provided in Table 3.2. The key
explanatory variable of interest is the cumulative number of years since a county was last in attain-
ment for ozone. Estimation of Equation 3.1 reveals that for each additional year of nonattainment
industrial CO2 would be reduced by 3,652 tons per year (TPY). This coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1% level, however, with a county-level average of 776,514 TPY, this seems to be
a very small change (0.4 % of the average). It is important to note that only 725 out of the 3,132
counties had any reported CO2 emissions from 1995-2006. With that in mind, I repeat the param-
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eter estimation of Equation 3.1 using only those 725 counties and found that for each additional
year of nonattainment, CO2 levels decreased by 9,783 TPY (results in Table 3.2). This result was
again statistically significant at the 1% level, however, by removing all of the counties that had
zero emissions reported, the mean level of emissions per county increased to 3,290,278 TPY. The
absolute change of 9,783 is only 0.2 % of the average level. Considering the average number of years
a county is in nonattainment for the 725 counties that reported CO2 emissions is 4.37, the yearly
reduction might be closer to 1% of the average emissions level, which is small, however meaningful
given that it is an unintended consequence.
Table 3.2: Results - Effect of Ozone Nonattainment On Industrial Carbon Dioxide
725 CO2 Emitting Counties
Industry CO2 Number of CO2 CO2 Tons Industry CO2 Number of CO2 CO2 Tons
(Tons) Facilities (Per Facility) (Tons) Facilities (Per Facility)
Ozone 68,804.8 ** -0.0663488 ** 48,222.68 ** 154,748.5 ** -.1751139 ** 102,649.2
Nonattainment [ 18,636.64 ] [ 0.0137432 ] [ 17919.98 ] [ 59,575.2 ] [ .0397648 ] [ 57,850.17 ]
Years of ozone -3,652.866 ** 0.0169608 ** -7,594.787 ** -9,783.234 ** .0280914 ** -13,966.76 **
nonattainment [ 1,317.545 ] [ 0.0009716 ] [ 1266.88 ] [ 3,730.987 ] [ .0024903 ] [ 3,622.954 ]
Population 493.1804 ** 0.0019034 ** -186.2589 * 275.6349 .0013197 ** -72.65834
density [ 91.53177 ] [ 0.0000675 ] [ 88.01197 ] [ 194.1021 ] [ .0001296 ] [ 188.4817 ]
Per capita 2.238978 8.68E-06 ** -2.20752 -7.350619 2.73e-06 -7.76108
income [ 1.320901 ] [ 9.74E-07 ] [ 1.270106 ] [ 5.971306 ] [ 3.99e-06 ] [ 5.798404 ]
Constant 620,945.3 ** -0.1117118 ** 616,030.1 ** 3,060,504 ** .5044627 ** 2,546,422 **
[ 25,505.95 ] [ 0.0188088 ] [ 24,525.14 ] [ 124,971.6 ] [ .0834152 ] [ 121,352.9 ]
Observations 36,864 36,864 36,864 8,700 8,700 8,700
R2 0.0101 0.0982 0.0042 0.0389 0.2660 0.0139
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The estimation of Equation 3.2 suggests a positive and statistically significant relationship
between the number of years of ozone nonattainment and CO2 reporting facilities (Table 3.2).
Although the magnitude of 0.02 additional facilities for each additional year of ozone nonattainment
is rather small, the maximum change in facilities in a single year is an increase of six facilities. Most
counties see no change in facilities or only an increase of a single facility in a single year. However,
the general trend in reporting facilities is increasing, especially in the 725 counties that report CO2
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emissions. This suggests that along the extensive margin, firms are not leaving counties due to
increased regulatory stringency.
The estimation of Equation 3.3 provides a key result at the intensive margin. The coefficient
on ‘Years Nonattainment’ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of
the coefficient suggests an even larger reduction in per facility emissions than at the county level as
a whole. For each additional year of ozone nonattainment, per facility CO2 emissions are declining
by 13,966 TPY (Table 3.2). Since the overall county-level decline in CO2 emissions was 9,783 TPY,
the per facility reductions seem to be offset by the increase in the number of facilities.
Figure 3.2 shows the significant decline in per facility emissions at the national level. This re-
duction is even more significant in nonattainment counties as evidenced by the results of this section,
which suggests evidence of spillover effects from the regulation of ozone. Since all nonattainment
NSR programs require the lowest achievable emissions rate and the best available technology, it
seems that this is likely to reduce emissions of a wide range of pollutants.
3.6 Conclusion
Previous studies have made a link between nonattainment status for criteria pollutants sub-
ject to the NAAQS of the Clean Air Act and emission levels for those specific pollutants. This
research expands on previous findings of regulatory spillover effects and analyzes the effect of ozone
regulation on industrial releases of carbon dioxide before carbon dioxide was regulated. The results
suggest that some spillover effects from the regulation of ozone exist which lead to a slight reduc-
tion of carbon dioxide emissions. Since facility numbers are increasing, but emissions per facility
are decreasing, then firms are emitting less and that is the primary factor causing the reduced
emissions. Cleaner facilities entering the county is a possible story consistent with this scenario.
This is likely due to updating production methods or installing new technology as required by the
New Source Review permit program for any new facilities in nonattainment counties, which should
reduce a wide range of pollutants. These results are significant because they show that it may not
be necessary to directly regulate every pollutant.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
All Counties (1995-2006)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Industrial CO2 (Tons) 36,864 776,514.2 2,806,313 0 3.16e+07
CO2 Reporting Facilities 36,864 0.3027886 0.786146 0 15
CO2 per Facilities (Tons) 36,864 573,051.2 2,129,445 0 2.57e+07
Nonattainment for ozone 36,864 0.1005588 0.3007477 0 1
Years of nonattainment for ozone 36,864 1.725966 5.897527 0 29
Per capita income 36,864 23,286.07 6,457.488 451 119,141
Population density 36,864 84.14475 577.8102 0 21,926.87
∆ CO2 33,792 9,799.591 342,047.2 -1.66e+07 6,790,776
∆ Reporting Facilities 33,792 0.0160097 0.1711951 -3 6
725 Counties Which Reported Positive Amounts of CO2 (1995-2006)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Industrial CO2 (Tons) 8,700 3,290,278 5,010,083 0 3.16e+07
CO2 Reporting Facilities 8,700 1.273103 1.172309 0 15
CO2 per Facilities (Tons) 8,700 2,428,156 3,835,442 0 2.57e+07
Nonattainment for ozone 8,700 0.2374713 0.4255578 0 1
Years of nonattainment for ozone 8,700 4.37046 8.854737 0 29
Per capita income 8,700 25,336.41 7,349.169 10451 111,346
Population density 8,700 242.367 1,159.433 .53 21,926.87
∆ CO2 7,975 41,523.23 703,186.8 -1.66e+07 6,790,776
∆ Reporting Facilities 7,975 0.0654545 0.3425792 -3 6
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Table 3.4: List of Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
APA Air Pollution Abatement
ARP Acid Rain Program
BACT Best Available Control Technology
CAA (1970) Clean Air Act (of 1970)
CAAA (1977 & 1990) Clean Air Act Amendments (of 1977 & 1990)
CAMD Clean Air Markets Division
CEM Continuous Emissions Monitoring
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
EGUs Energy Generating Units
EMSs Environmental Management Systems
EMPs Environmental Management Practices
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
GHGs Greenhouse Gases
HAPs Hazardous Air Pollutants
LAER Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate
MACT Maximum Available Control Technology
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NESHAPs National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NSPS New Source Performance Standards
NSR New Source Review
PACE Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration
RACT Reasonably Available Control Technology
SIP State Implementation Plan
TPY Tons Per Year (unit of emissions)
TSP Total Suspended Particulates
USC United States Code
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds
Chapter 4
Regional Heterogeneity In Preferences For Air Quality Regulation and the
Effect of Pro-Environment Voting On Toxic Emissions
The structure of the air quality regulatory environment in the United States is such that
minimum federal standards are set by the Environmental Protection Agency. Federal standards
could include maximum allowable ambient concentration of certain pollutants or requirements of
the technology that must be employed by new or existing firms. Over time the enforcement of
federal standards has become the responsibility of local enforcement agencies. Hence, at the local
level there exists heterogeneity in the degree of enforcement of these federal standards. Sometimes
heterogeneity is imposed on specific areas because of non-compliance of federal standards. It can
also exist because citizens have a preference for a cleaner environment and those who cannot afford
it themselves will prefer greater regulatory stringency at the local level in order to obtain it. The
primary objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of citizen preferred greater regulatory
stringency on the level of emissions within counties using pro-environment voting at the national
level as a proxy for these attitudes.
One of the challenges researchers face when analyzing the effects of environmental regulation
on air emissions is the choice of measurement used to describe the regulatory environment. The
absence of direct measures of regulation forces researchers to rely on proxies and certain assump-
tions to describe regulatory stringency. One indirect measure that has been used is congressional
voting records on environmental issues which, assuming that votes in Congress reflect attitudes of
constituents, acts as a proxy for citizen attitudes towards a tighter regulatory climate. Common
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practice in the literature is to use state averages of votes from the U.S. House of Representatives or
U.S. Senate as a proxy for community attitudes. It seems reasonable to assume that a county-level
voting score would be a better proxy for the local regulatory environment than voting scores at the
state level, because aggregation at the state level fails to identify which communities in the state
are pro-environment. This is important because within each state there are “green” counties and
counties that care comparatively little about the environment. An independent organization known
as the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) keeps scorecard records on pro-environmental voting
behavior of both U.S. Representatives and U.S. Senators. Using these scores provides a measure
of how each politician voted and is assumed to proxy how much each community or county values
the environment, regardless of how many pro-environment bills are actually passed at the national
level.
Several studies have attempted to link measures of citizen attitudes toward pollution to
regulatory stringency and its impact on firm behavior. For example, Henderson [35] considers state
attitudes toward pollution as measured by the fixed-effect term from a fixed-effects regression with
pollution abatement expenditures as the dependent variable. This fixed effect measures the degree
to which states either “over spend” or “under spend” on abatement activity with overspending
being associated with pro-environment attitudes. He identifies measures of time-invariant attitudes
toward pollution and finds that a 1-percent increase in abatement expenditures leads to a 0.04-0.05
percent improvement in air quality measures. Gray and Shadbegian [29] evaluate temporal and
cross-sectional variation in state-level aggregates of League of Conservation Voting (LCV) records
and find that the share of a firm’s production arising at the state level is negatively related to LCV
scores. Gray [28] also uses state-level aggregates of LCV scores as a measure of attitudes towards
pollution and finds that firm births across states are negatively related to LCV scores. Terry and
Yandel [57] link TRI and LCV scores in a 50-state cross-sectional analysis in which they examine
the effect of 1988 average LCV rating for each state’s two senators on the 1992 level of stack air
emissions reported by the TRI. They find a negative, but insignificant coefficient on the LCV score
variable.
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While findings from the previous studies that measure attitudes at the state level have been
consistent, to my knowledge, no study has used LCV scores from the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives to explore the impact of voter attitudes at the county level. This research is the first to
create county-level scores for pro-environment voting by mapping congressional district scores to
the county level and creating weighted scores for counties that partially lie in multiple districts.
The results suggest that allowing for regional heterogeneity in preferences at the county level can
explain within-state variation in toxic emissions where state-level aggregates fail to identify such
a relationship. Voting behavior appears to take between one and three years to have an effect on
emissions.
4.1 Conceptual Framework
When firms release toxic emissions as a byproduct of the production process, this creates
what is referred to in economics as a negative externality. Negative externalities are costs imposed
on nearby residents that are not taken into account in the production decisions of firms. These
types of costs lead to an output level that is not socially efficient. Coase bargaining [18] is generally
not a possible solution since the number of affected individuals is typically large. Collective action
against firms responsible for the negative externalities created by toxic releases could be considered
a public good. Many individuals desire better air quality, but few are willing to provide the socially
optimal level themselves due to the free-rider problem. According to the basic economic theory on
public goods, the marginal private benefits of contributing to collective action are much less than
the marginal social benefits at the point where the marginal private costs and benefits are equal,
leading to under-provision of the public good. Recognizing that clean air benefits society and that
it will not be provided by individuals, the government must choose the appropriate level of air
quality and provide it by regulating emissions.
In order to make the connection between citizen preferences for regulation and voting patterns
as a proxy for regulation and ultimately the effect on toxic releases, I construct a model and explain
key links with findings from previous studies. The model links four fundamental questions relating
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how citizen attitudes or preferences for more or less regulation are translated into environmental
outcomes through congressional voting. The four questions are 1.) Which groups are most affected
by pollution? 2.) Which groups prefer more regulation? 3.) How do legislators decide which way
to vote on environmental policy? and 4.) Do voting outcomes lead to reductions in emissions?
The purpose of looking at these four questions separately will help show that shirking is less of a
concern when using U.S. Representatives’ voting as a proxy for citizen preferences at the county
level. Also, it is not as simple as assuming that votes either reflect citizen preferences or legislator
ideologies, since within counties there are different preferences for or against increased regulation
that need to be considered by the legislator. Figure 4.1 summarizes the key features of the model
and I have identified important links which I will refer to as links A,. . . ,F.
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework
I consider four groups of individuals whose attitudes or preferences for more or less regulation
are likely to influence decisions. These four individual groups are categorized into two larger groups:
pro-business sector and residential sector. The residential sector is divided into low-income, high-
income, and minority households. It is likely that minority communities are a subset of the low-
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income classification, but at the very least there is a large intersection of the two groups. The
pro-business sector represents anyone who is employed in one of the polluting industries.
The model suggests that the adverse effects of pollution will be primarily present in lower
income and minority communities. The designation of high versus low income is somewhat arbitrary
and is slightly unclear from the literature what the exact distinction should be regarding who is
most affected by pollution. The poverty line could be chosen as the specific means of separating
low from high income designation within counties, but it seems at the county level from Figure 4.2
that the counties most negatively affected by toxic releases are counties with a per capita income
slightly higher than the poverty line. Per capita income is sensitive to high income outliers and
income distributions are usually right-skewed, which would suggest that those most affected by the
pollution are those who may be below the poverty line. Link A in Figure 4.1 shows that pollution
affects lower income and minority populations.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Toxic Air Emissions (TRI) by County Per capita Income
Preferences for more or less regulation vary by group. Those individuals closely associated
with business interest will prefer less regulation (link B) since more regulation leads to higher costs
of production and lower profit for business owners as well as potential job loss for workers employed
in polluting industries. Because business owners do not directly benefit from cleaner air quality,
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their net benefits will be negative. Most individuals who live in low-income neighborhoods will
prefer more regulation (link D in Figure 4.1) because regulation yields a positive net benefit. They
receive the benefits of cleaner air quality, which likely outweigh the costs of slightly higher taxes 1 .
The exception to this assumption would be those individuals who live in low-income neighborhoods,
but who are employed in the polluting industry. It is assumed that these individuals would prefer
job security to more regulation. According to this model, these individuals’ preferences would be
represented by link B in Figure 4.1. The preferences of the individuals who live in high-income
neighborhoods are uncertain. It is reasonable to assume that these individuals place a high value
on environmental quality, but it is unclear whether they prefer regulation as a means of obtaining
higher environmental quality. The most likely outcome will be that those who can afford to move to
locations with higher environmental quality will self-select into cleaner neighborhoods rather than
relying on the government to provide it for them. On the other hand, there may be individuals
who prefer a cleaner environment for society as a whole for altruistic reasons and they realize
that regulation is one possible means of achieving that objective. These individuals are generally
the more educated and realize that better air quality is a public good that is likely to be under
produced. Therefore, it is possible that the high-income households could prefer either more or less
regulation (link C in Figure 4.1), even though individuals acting in their own self-interest would
simply move to cleaner locations.
Three likely objectives of career politicians are re-election (do whatever it takes to keep their
job), altruism (place high priority on doing what is in their constituents’ interests), and contribute
their own ideologies to the decision making process (regardless of what constituents want). For
those whose main priority is re-election, in order to maximize the likelihood of being re-elected,
politicians must be aware of their constituents’ interests on various issues. When deciding how to
vote, the representative for county i takes into account the preferences of all four groups (shown
by links B,C,D in Figure 4.1), even though they may not all be equally represented. One would
1 The increase in costs of regulatory enforcement would be publicly financed through higher taxes, although, given
the marginal tax structure, the increase in taxes on low-income households would not be as great as the increase for
high-income households
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expect those groups who are the most organized to communicate their preferences most clearly.
Often the most organized are those representing business interests and are frequently found in
Washington D.C. lobbying for less regulation. Communities that are less homogeneous, such as
minority communities, are less likely to form collective action against polluting industries. The
longer the terms of elected representatives, the greater is the likelihood of shirking from their
constituents’ interests, because they are most likely to take into account constituent interests when
they are close to re-election. The term length of U.S. Representatives is two years which makes
them more accountable to their constituencies than U.S. Senators whose term lengths are six years.
The primary focus of this chapter analyzes how voting behavior of U.S. Representatives affects
the level of county-level toxic air releases (links E,F in Figure 4.1). The theory would predict that
the more pro-environment the representative’s vote the greater the reduction of toxic releases (link
F ) will be. The argument is that if there is pro-environment voting at the national level, then there
must be overwhelming support for more regulation at the county level, especially since the ones
most likely to support more regulation are the ones whose voices are least likely to be heard.
4.1.1 Which groups are most affected by pollution?
There exists a wide body of literature dealing with the question of how community character-
istics influence environmental outcomes. Generally, all studies have arrived at the conclusion that
the two groups most affected by pollution are low-income communities and minority communities,
although most studies argue in favor of either one or the other. The distribution of county-level
toxic emissions in Figure 4.2 shows that there is a very high concentration of toxic releases in coun-
ties in which the per capita income level is below $25,000, where Figure 4.3 shows TRI facilities
are generally located in counties with a per capita income level of $30,000 or below.
A number of studies have analyzed within-county variation in community characteristics to
try to identify which groups are the most disproportionally exposed to toxic releases. The following
studies have conducted zip code-level analyses and have arrived at varying conclusions: Banzhaf
and Walsh [9], Brooks and Sethi [12], Ringquist [54], Arora and Cason [7]. Link A is based on the
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Number of TRI Facilities by County Per capita Income
findings of these papers. For this model, I assume that both low-income and minorities are affected
by toxic releases.
According to Banzhaf and Walsh [9], low-income families are the most negatively affected.
They conduct an empirical test of the Tiebout [58] hypothesis that individuals sort into communities
with optimal bundles of taxes and public goods. Assuming firm location to be exogenous, they
find that the presence of TRI facilities causes the composition of a community to become poorer
over time. This is a result of composition effects suggesting that pollution leads to out-migration
by the wealthier households and/or in-migration of poorer households and is consistent with the
Tiebout hypothesis. They find that racial composition effects are weak. Arora and Cason [7] find
evidence of greater releases in poverty stricken neighborhoods, but also find that race is a significant
determinant of toxic releases in the nonurban south, but not elsewhere in the country. Kriesel et al
[44] find that minorities are not disproportionally exposed to toxic releases, but find some evidence
that poor communities are disproportionally exposed to toxic releases. Additional studies from
Gray and Shadbegian [30] and Videras [59] draw similar conclusions. Gray and Shadbegian [30]
have found evidence that plants in low income communities pollute more, however not in minority
communities. Videras [59] also finds that low-income households are more likely to be exposed to
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environmental hazards and are more likely to benefit from the provision of a cleaner environment.
Ringquist [54] evaluates the claim that TRI facilities are located in poor and minority com-
munities and, after controlling for a variety of background factors, finds that TRI facilities and
pollution are concentrated in zip codes with large minority representation. Brooks and Sethi [12]
find that minority (or specifically more ethnically diverse) communities are more likely to be af-
fected by pollution due to the lower likelihood of collective action. They also find that only for the
highest income groups with annual incomes exceeding $67,000 per year does higher median income
imply lower exposure to emissions. It could be that specific groups are targeted when firms emitting
hazardous waste make decisions to locate, for instance, because of the perception that certain types
of communities will be less willing and able to engage in costly collective action against the firms.
4.1.2 Which groups prefer more regulation?
In this section, a distinction must be made between preferences for cleaner environment
and preferences for more regulation. It is generally accepted that most people recognize the health
benefits of a clean environment and that it contributes positively to the value of outdoor recreation.
Those with the means of affording it will obtain higher environmental quality through such examples
as the purchase of homes in the foothills of the mountains, private golf memberships, or eco-
tourism. They are likely to prefer less regulation because the benefits do not directly affect them.
They will likely face higher taxes as a result and possibly experience a reduction in home values as
previously undesirable areas become more attractive. Those who cannot afford a clean environment
for themselves will have to rely on the government to regulate and protect their health.
Fischel [23] finds that income, occupation, and education are robust determinants of prefer-
ences for environmental quality and that voting on environmental quality is divided along economic
and social class lines. Some studies have used referendum data in an attempt to identify how differ-
ent groups within a region differ in their preferences for regulation. Kahn and Matsusaka [38] using
data from sixteen California Initiatives find that environmental goods, such as parks, appear to be
normal goods for people with the mean income level and inferior goods for people with high income.
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Their findings support the claim that the wealthy can purchase these goods privately and therefore
do not prefer public provision of environmental quality which would be provided through higher
taxes. Kahn [37] focuses on how changing demographics affect the perceived benefits and costs of
regulation, and finds that minorities, youths, the more educated, and those who do not work in
polluting industries are more likely to support environmental regulation. Elliot et al [22], using
aggregate level determinants of support for environmental protection over a span of two decades,
find that as real per capita income increases, support for additional spending on environmental pol-
icy increases as well. They obtain public opinion data from both the National Opinions Research
Center (NORC) and the Roper Surveys that solicit respondents’ views on environmental spending
One concern is, even if individual group preferences are known, the line of communication
between the low-income and minority populations and their legislators is unclear. It has been
argued that minorities are less likely to form collective action [12] and are therefore less likely to
convey their concerns. Because different groups are less likely to bond with members of another
minority group, this is even more of a concern when the composition of minority communities is
heterogeneous. It is also important to consider the opportunity cost of each individual group’s
time. Lower income families do not have the luxury of much free time for collective action. Lower
paying jobs require more hours of labor to earn money necessary for survival. Therefore, the
opportunity cost of lobbying politicians is much higher for low-income families than for those with
higher incomes and more free time.
4.1.3 How do legislators decide which way to vote?
To consider which way a legislator will vote, one must first identify the incentives facing
the individual. The incentives will be very different based upon the position of government under
consideration. If many of these public officials have chosen this as their career of choice, then it
seems reasonable to assume that they would have a strict preference to be re-elected so that they
might continue in this line of work. There is also the possibility that certain individuals would
like to work their way up to a legislative decision-making position offering them a chance to make
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their own political ideologies heard. Another possible incentive would be to do whatever is best for
constituents, making constituent interest a priority.
Peltzman [51] starts with a basic framework in which voting patterns are a function of ideology
of the legislator and the interest of the constituents. Fort et al [24] add in a time-path component to
the model which addresses the sensitivity of shirking behavior near re-election time. Since ideology
and citizen preferences are not directly observable, all studies that try to estimate these effects
on voting patterns have to rely on various proxies. Common proxies for citizen preferences are
community economic and social characteristics assumed to be correlated with preferences. For
legislator ideology, a number of studies have used either some measure of party affiliation, such as
whether they are republican or democrat 2 or voting records by a group such as the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) [51]. Fort et al [24] treat ideology as an error term which would be the
part of the model not explained by community characteristics.
The following equation summarizes the primary factors that influence the way legislators vote
on environmental policies and builds upon the models of Peltzman [51] and Fort et al [24].
V OTE = f(I, η × Pj) (4.1)
η =
T − τ
T
+ ψ (4.2)
for j ∈ {B, H, L, M}. I represents specific ideology of the representative. P is a vector of
preferences for either more or less regulation of group j, where B represents business interests, H
represents high-income neighborhood residents, L represents low-income neighborhood residents,
M represents minority neighborhood residents. In Equation 4.2, η is a measure of how much
constituent preferences figure in to the legislator’s voting decision. T is term length where T = 6
for U.S. Senators and T = 2 for U.S. Representatives. τ is the number of years before the legislator
is up for re-election and decreases with time3 . Fort et al [24] argue that closer scrutiny at re-
election time is expected to tighten the principle-agent relationship, so ∂η∂τ < 0 implies the closer
2 With the assumption that the more liberal the party affiliation, the more likely they will be to vote pro-
environment
3 τ = 0 in a re-election year
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the representative is to a re-election year, the more closely they would be expected to take into
account constituent preferences. ψ is a measure of altruism which is on the interval [0, 1], where
1 means that the legislator cares a lot about doing what is best for their constituents, regardless
of whether they are up for re-election or not, and 0 means they do not care at all except for the
purpose of being re-elected. η should approach 1 + ψ as the legislator gets closer to an election
year.
The six-year term length of U.S. Senators makes them less accountable to their constituents,
at least for the first three to four years of their term, compared to U.S. Representatives who
serve only two-year terms and are more dependent on keeping constituents satisfied for frequent
re-elections. Therefore, U.S. Representatives should echo the voices of their constituents much
more closely than U.S. senators. The key assumption here about the link between LCV scores
and regulatory behavior is that if counties are putting pressure on their politicians at the national
level, then they are most likely putting equal, if not greater, pressure on their local politicians and
regulators to implement stricter regulations.
The question of shirking has been addressed by a number of papers in the literature. Peltz-
man [51] argues that shirking should not be a concern. Liberals and conservatives tend to appeal
to voters with certain incomes, education, and occupations, and draw contributions from different
interest groups. Because of these systematic differences, rationalizing voting patterns does not
require relying on explanations that involve shirking. Only on social policy issues (abortion, school
prayer, and so on) did ideology play a prominent role. Kalt and Zupan (1984) [39] find that both
constituent interests and legislator ideology are important factors. They find evidence that within
a principal-agent relationship legislators operate with enough slack to vote according to their own
ideological tastes. Kalt and Zupan (1990) [40] use an ideological residual which is consistent with
a liberal-conservative ideological spectrum and that is shown to respond to slack in the principle-
agent relationship. Hamilton [34] concludes that the theory of rational political ignorance can help
explain legislator preferences for policy instruments to control pollution. Legislators from districts
with more toxic emissions face trade-offs in support within their districts, because proposed envi-
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ronmental policies often increase the costs of polluting industries, but reduce the risks to residents
from exposure to hazardous chemicals. Gilligan and Matsusaka’s [25] findings provide support for
the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would
like. Durden et al [20] find that legislators may be viewed as representing strong, well organized in-
terest groups’ preferences in exchange for direct and indirect political currency. Goff and Grier [26]
believe the question of whether legislators fail to represent their constituencies is currently unan-
swered by the literature, and cannot be answered by models making cross-sectional comparisons of
the voting behavior of U.S. Senators.
4.1.4 Do voting outcomes lead to reductions in emissions?
Once the votes in Congress have been passed, the question of what effect they have on
environmental outcomes naturally arises. It should be understood that their effect is really not a
direct effect, but rather a proxy for increased regulatory stringency at the local level based upon
the preferences of the citizens for a tighter regulatory climate. A limited number of studies have
analyzed the effect of voting on environmental outcomes, but have only done so at the state-level.
There is naturally room for further investigation if the study attempts to analyze this question at
a more localized unit observation, which is the primary objective of this chapter.
Gray and Shadbegian [29] use state-level aggregates of League of Conservation Voters (LCV)
records to find that the share of a firm’s production arising at the state level is negatively related
to LCV scores. They use LCV scores as their principle index of regulatory stringency because of
the time-series variation. Gray [28] also uses state-level aggregates of LCV scores as a measure of
attitudes towards pollution and finds that firm births across states are negatively related to LCV
scores. Terry and Yandel [57] link TRI and LCV scores in a 50-state cross-sectional analysis in
which they examine the effect of 1988 average LCV rating for each state’s two senators on the 1992
level of stack air emissions reported by the TRI. They find a negative, but insignificant coefficient
on the LCV score variable. Shadbegian and Gray [56] conduct a study which examines plant-
level economic and environmental performance for three industries. Using a Seemingly Unrelated
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Regressions (SUR) framework they find a negative and statistically significant relationship between
state-level LCV scores (average of U.S. Representatives) and toxic releases for the oil and paper
industries.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 League of Conservation Voters
The League of Conservation Voters [49] is an independent organization which tracks con-
gressional voting records on environmental issues. The annual scorecards report the percentage
of pro-environment votes cast by each legislator in a given year. Voting in favor of all possible
environmental policies would earn a score of 100 and voting against all policies would earn a score
of 0. There are scores reported for both U.S. Representatives and U.S. Senators. Every year there
are roughly seven different votes cast by Senators on such topics as Gulf drilling and farm conser-
vation funding. For Representatives there are somewhere between twelve and sixteen votes cast
each year on such topics as EPA enforcement, Arctic drilling, fuel economy, and energy efficiency.
Each representative is given a score from 0 to 100 with 100 being the most pro-environment. To
identify variation in standards at the county level I use the LCV scores of U.S. Representatives.
The League of Conservation Voters issues scorecards on a yearly basis starting in 1970. The
scorecards previous to 1989 become slightly problematic because they are calculated bi-annually.
Therefore, 1987 and 1988 would share the same score. Another issue with the data is that the
Speaker of the House votes at his or her discretion, so there are no votes recorded for those districts
that are represented by the current Speaker of the House. Michigan’s District 3 is missing voting
scores in 1993 because Rep. Paul Henry was ill for part of this session of Congress and passed away.
His replacement, Rep. Vern Ehlers, was elected to Congress on December 8th, 1993. The LCV
reports no score for District 3 in 1993. New Jersey’s District 1 is also missing a score in 1990 because
Rep. Jim Florio was elected Governor in 1989 and his House seat was not filled until November
1990. The missing observations are summarized in Table B.4 of the appendix. Table B.5 lists the
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four Speakers of the House from 1988 to 2002, the years they served, and which state/district they
represented.
4.2.2 County level versus state or congressional district level
Due to the nature of aggregation, using state averages of U.S. House or Senate voting as a
proxy for community standards fails to identify which communities in the state are pro-environment,
because within each state there are pro-environment counties and counties that care very little about
the environment. For example, Figure 4.4 shows the average LCV score for the state of Colorado
from 1988 to 2002. Based on this trend it appears that Colorado is not very pro-environment.
However, Figure 4.4 also shows two counties in Colorado that are quite different: Boulder County
which is very pro-environment and Larimer County which is not.
Figure 4.4: Time Trend of Colorado LCV Scores
While congressional districts are a more localized unit of observation than state-level, one
thing is problematic when using them in a panel data set. Congressional district lines are redrawn
every decennial Census. Figure 4.5 shows the LCV scores for two Michigan counties, Leelanau
County and Muskegon County, from 1988-2002. Both counties are in Congressional District 9 from
1988-1992 based on the 1980 Census, but after district lines are redrawn for the 1990 Census,
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Leelanau County is designated as District 1 and Muskegon is designated as District 2 from 1993-
2002. In Figure 4.5, when Leelanau County was in the same district as Muskegon County, the
LCV scores were relatively low compared to the LCV scores after the switch to District 1. Any
county can experience this same drastic variation as preferences change or when new legislators are
elected who may have significantly different environmental goals relative to their predecessor. The
key objective is to find a more localized unit of observation that does not change boundaries over
times (or at least very rarely in the case of county lines).
Figure 4.5: LCV Trends for Leelanau and Muskegon Counties, MI
4.2.3 Constructing county-level measures
When constructing county-level measures of LCV scores for the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, which are available at the congressional district level, two challenges arise: district lines are
redrawn every ten years based on the decennial Census and a number of counties lie partially in
multiple districts. The Census lists each congressional district and which counties are represented
by that district. Most counties are completely contained within a single district, but there are 454
counties which belong to multiple districts. To illustrate, consider the hypothetical state in Figure
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4.6 which has nine counties (A-I) and three congressional districts (1-3). Counties A, C, D, F, and
H all lie within a single district, while counties B, G, and I lie in two districts, and county E lies in
all three districts.
Figure 4.6: Congressional District to County Mapping
The Census provides the population of each county in a congressional district. Making a list
of all counties, I record which districts are in each county and calculate what percentage of the
county’s population is in each district. Therefore, for counties that resemble county E in Figure
4.6, I construct a weighted LCV score for each county that lies in multiple districts by multiplying
the LCV score from each district by its percentage of the county. Counties that are completely
contained within a district simply assume the score of that district. This procedure must be done
for every ten-year Census period. I construct a panel of county-level LCV scores from 1988 to 2002
based on the 1980 Census (for years 1988-1992) and the 1990 Census (for years 1993-2002).
4.3 Empirical Specifications
The primary objective of the empirical model is to examine what effect congressional voting
on environmental policies has on toxic emissions at a local level. With that focus in mind, if
toxic releases are to decrease, the second objective of the model is then to identify whether it is
due to facilities leaving the county or shutting down because of increased regulatory stringency
(extensive margin) or whether firms reduce their emissions by decreasing production or installing
or upgrading abatement technology because of increased regulatory stringency (intensive margin).
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The third objective of the model is to run the same empirical analysis using both county-level
and state-level data to compare the results in order to see if anything is to be gained from taking
advantage of within-state variation.
The most similar empirical specification to this study is the one used by Terry and Yandle
(T-Y) [57] in an attempt to identify a relationship between LCV scores and toxic releases (TRI).
However, there are key differences between the two studies4 . T-Y conduct their study at the state
level while this study is conducted at the county level. T-Y use the average voting records of the two
U.S. Senators in each state and this study uses voting records from U.S. Representatives constructed
at the county level. The T-Y study is a cross-sectional analysis and this study takes advantage
of panel data. While T-Y have a larger number of control variables than I do in this study, it is
necessary when conducting a cross-sectional analysis to include as many relevant variables (time-
variant and time-invariant) as possible, otherwise the estimation will suffer from omitted variable
bias. The advantage of panel data is that time-invariant variables can be differenced out using
a first-differences model or time demeaned using a fixed-effects model, which greatly reduces the
required number of variables for estimation, while not leading to omitted variable bias. That being
said, there are still time-variant variables that I feel would be relevant to this study, but I was
unable to obtain at this time.
One concern with estimation is the potential endogeneity between LCV and TRI emissions.
While it is possible that a higher LCV score will lead to a reduction in emissions, it also seems
reasonable to assume that higher emissions levels could cause greater concerns about pollution and,
therefore, higher LCV scores. T-Y also recognize this potential identification issue and they use
the 1988 average of Senators LCV scores to explain TRI in 1992 (a four-year lag). In an attempt to
identify the relationship between LCV scores (or more precisely the standards for which they proxy)
and pollution, I treat previous years’ LCV scores as the independent variable to test whether there
is an effect on the current level of pollution, since current pollution should not have any effect on
4 Terry and Yandle use LCV scores as one of a number of key explanatory variables. Their study does not place
the primary focus on LCV scores
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LCV scores in years prior to the current time period. Following that line of reasoning, I construct
one- to five-year lagged LCV scores for at least 10 years in order to explain the effect of these
scores on TRI emissions as well as how long before these policies would be effective. I construct a
15-year panel data set which includes the years 1988-2002 and includes the top fifty percent of TRI
emitting counties, due to the large number of counties with zero emissions (743 counties) over the
fifteen year period. The dependent variable is total pounds of stack air emissions from the TRI. The
key explanatory variable is the county-level measure of LCV scores, which has been constructed as
previously described.
To estimate the effect of pro-environment voting on overall toxic releases using an ordinary
least squares fixed-effects framework, I estimate the parameters of the following equation
TRIit = α0 + α1LCVit−l + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (4.3)
where TRIit represents the measure of total pounds of TRI stack air emissions in county i in year t.
LCVit−l is the pro-environment voting score for county i in year t− l where l ∈ {1, . . . , 5} denotes
the year lag. Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes population density and per capita
income. To control for year effects that affect all counties, I include d1989t,. . . ,d2002t as dummy
variables for years 1989-2002. The term γi is the county fixed effects, which includes all factors
within a given county that do not vary over time. To remove γi, I use time demeaning which is the
fixed-effects transformation model. it is the idiosyncratic error term.
If toxic releases are decreasing as a result of higher LCV scores, the second objective of the
empirical model is to identify whether this decrease is due to facilities leaving the county or shutting
down because of increased regulatory stringency (extensive margin) or whether firms reduce their
emissions by decreasing production or installing or upgrading abatement technology because of
increased regulatory stringency (intensive margin). The second part of the model combines two
specifications to analyze the effect of pro-environment voting on the number of TRI reporting
facilities per county as well as per facility emissions. The panel data set is the same as above using
years 1988-2002 and the top fifty percent of TRI emitting counties, however, in these specifications
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the dependent variables are the number of TRI reporting facilities per county and pounds of TRI
stack air emissions per facility per county. To find out whether toxic releases are decreasing due to
fewer facilities (extensive margin) or lower per-facility emissions (intensive margin), I estimate the
parameters of the following two equations
Facilitiesit = α0 + α1LCVit−l + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (4.4)
Emissions/Facilityit = α0 + α1LCVit−l + Xitβ + δ1d1989t + . . .+ δ14d2002t + γi + it (4.5)
using an ordinary least squares fixed-effects framework where Facilitiesit represents the measure
of TRI reporting facilities in county i in year t. Emissions/Facilityit is per-facility emissions in
county i in year t. LCVit−l is the pro-environment voting score for county i in year t − l where l
∈ {1, . . . , 5} denotes the year lag. Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes population
density and per capita income. d1989t,. . . ,d2002t are dummy variables for years 1989-2002. The
term γi is the county fixed effects term and it is the idiosyncratic error term.
To address the third objective of comparing the county-level results to the state-level results, I
repeat the estimation of Equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 using the state-level aggregates of the variables
used in the county-level analysis. The state-level TRI measure (TRIjt) is total pounds of TRI
stack air emissions in state j in year t. The state-level TRI facilities measure (Facilitiesjt) is
the sum of all TRI reporting facilities in state j in year t. The state-level per-facility emissions
(Emissions/Facilityjt) is total pounds of TRI stack air emissions in state j in year t divided by
the total number of reporting facilities for that state in year t. The state-level LCV score (LCVjt−l)
is the average of the voting scores of the Representatives from all Congressional Districts in the
state for each of l ∈ {1,. . . ,5} lags. Also included are the dummy variables for years 1989-2002 and
the γj state fixed effects term. jt is the idiosyncratic error term.
4.4 Results
The objectives of the empirical model are 1.) to estimate the effect of pro-environment
voting on toxic emissions at a local level, 2.) to identify whether emissions are decreasing due to
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firm exodus (extensive margin) or a reduction in per-facility emissions (intensive margin), and 3.)
to compare the results from county-level analysis and state-level analysis. The estimation results
of Equation 4.3 for both county- and state-level measures are summarized in Table 4.1 for the one-
to three-year lags (Table B.1 for the four- to five-year lags).
Table 4.1: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On TRI Emissions
Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds
(County) (State) (County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−1 -1,280.308* -31,085.81
[553.131] [42,501.11]
LCVt−2 -1,281.848* -19,852.57
[545.846] [44,346.65]
LCVt−3 -1,161.952* -52,967.85
[549.995] [46,287.1]
Population -1,128.57** 770,888.9** -1,059.464** 775,656.2** -926.332** 799,375.8**
Density [360.507] [152,557.4] [346.569] [160,789.6] [346.055] [174,099]
Per Capita -10.277 -2,055.13** -2.546 -2,019.077** -0.179 -1,997.423**
Income [8.496] [605.2238] [8.424] [623.136] [8.670] [656.638]
Constant 1,357,457** 2.20e+07* 1,149,401** 1.87e+07 1,030,528 1.59e+07
[216,740] [1.11e+07] [214,809] [1.17e+07] [148,060] [1.25e+07]
Observations 21,883 700 20,322 650 18,761 600
R2 0.0133 0.1938 0.0144 0.1927 0.0159 0.1997
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Parameter estimation of Equation 4.3 confirms the expectation that higher LCV scores at the
county-level lead to a slight reduction of TRI emissions since the coefficient on LCVit−l is negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level for l ∈ {1,2,3}. The model predicts that a 1-point
increase in LCV score would lead to an overall decrease of TRI emissions per county by roughly
1,200 pounds. Even though this is statistically significant, with an average level of emissions in
a county 897,266 pounds, this does not seem to be a very significant effect unless the voter score
increased by a very significant amount. An increase in LCV score from 0 to 100 would be expected
to decrease toxic releases by 120,000 pounds within one to three years.
With a closer look at the data, I identify counties that experience an increase of at least 50
LCV points to see if the model’s prediction would hold true. Three different Michigan counties
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that fit the criteria offer some verification. A look at the emissions levels of Alpena County shows
that it is one of the high-emission counties in the state with an average of 1,222,064 pounds of
toxic emissions per year. Figure 4.7 shows two time trends for Alpena County: LCV scores and
the level of TRI emissions over the fifteen-year period. Alpena County experienced a significant
increase in LCV score of 69 points from 1992 to 1993 when the 1990 Census lines were redrawn and
Alpena switched from District 11 to District 1. The model would predict that an increase in LCV
score of 69 points would lead to a decrease of 82,800 TRI pounds within one to three years. From
1995 to 1996, three years after the LCV increase, Alpena County saw a decrease in emissions from
3,260,926 pounds to 2,846,030 pounds (an absolute change of 414,896 for a 12% decrease), which
is a fairly substantial change. One year after that change, there was an even larger decrease from
2,846,030 in 1996 to 1,555,671 in 1997 (an absolute change of -1,290,359 for a 45.3% decrease),
which is a very significant reduction in emissions.
Figure 4.7: LCV and TRI Trends for Alpena County, MI
Other Michigan counties that experienced a significant increase in LCV scores from 1992 to
1993 were Antrim and Delta Counties. Antrim County, with an average level of toxic emissions
around 12,758 pounds per year, is a county with a much lower level of toxic emissions than Alpena
County. The 69-point increase in LCV score from 1992 to 1993 lead to a decrease in TRI from
15,600 pounds in 1994 to 10,000 pounds in 1995. This absolute change of 5,600 is much less than
the model predicts, but, given the relatively low level of emissions, is a 35.8% decrease, which
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is a significant reduction in emissions. Delta County with average emissions per year equal to
640,650 pounds also experienced a 69-point increase in LCV score from 1992 to 1993 which lead
to a decrease in TRI from 687,850 pounds in 1996 to 538,840 pounds in 1997. This was a 21.6%
decrease in emissions.
The coefficient estimates of LCVjt−l from Equation 4.3 using state-level measures are not
statistically significant, so it seems that county-level measures provide more accurate measures of
citizen preferences for regulation. Significance at the county level but not at the state level would
suggest that changes are taking place in emissions within states and across counties rather than
across states because the LCV scores represent local preferences and not preferences for the state
as a whole. From the summary statistics in Table 4.4, aggregation to the state level smooths out
the variability such that the maximum absolute change in LCV scores is 53 points, where at the
county level the maximum absolute change is 92 points.
The second part of the model decomposes the extensive and intensive margins. From the
parameter estimation of Equation 4.4, the number of TRI reporting facilities is predicted to decline
as a result of higher LCV scores. From Table 4.2, the coefficients of LCVit−l for the county-level
data are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for l ∈ {1,2} which would suggest
that firms are exiting the counties or shutting down because of increased regulatory stringency.
However, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that LCV is not enough of a factor to cause
facilities to exit or shut down at the county level. A one-point increase in LCV score leads to 0.006
fewer facilities at the county level and 0.27 fewer facilities at the state level. This does not seem to
have a significant effect at the county level since the maximum increase in LCV score from 0 to 100
would only lead to a 0.6 facility decrease. This is not too surprising given that LCV is an indirect
measure of regulatory stringency. Also, the average number of facilities in a county is about 8 and
the average change in facilities is -0.006. At the state level there seems to be a small meaningful
effect on facility numbers since the coefficient on LCVjt−l is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level for l = 1. The model predicts that the maximum increase in LCV score from 0 to
100 in state j would lead to a decrease of 27 facilities.
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Table 4.2: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On TRI Facilities
Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities
(County) (State) (County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−1 -.00661** -.273*
[.00141] [.139]
LCVt−2 -.00415** -.110
[.00143] [.141]
LCVt−3 -.000792 .0330
[.00131] [.129]
Population -.00357** -1.408** -.00323** -1.162* -.00172* -.688
Density [.000921] [.499] [.000908] [.511] [.000827] [.486]
Per Capita -.000385** -.0101** -.00036** -.00956** -.000320** -.00883**
Income [.0000217] [.00198] [.0000221] [.00198] [.0000208] [.00183]
Constant 18.774** 579.225** 18.014** 573.584** 14.831** 518.125**
[.553] [36.428] [.563] [37.356] [.354] [35.007]
Observations 21,883 700 20,322 650 18,761 600
R2 0.0422 0.2636 0.0426 0.2723 0.0407 0.2691
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
From the parameter estimation of Equation 4.5, the lack of statistical significance with the
exception of the two-year lag on LCV suggests that votes have an effect on per facility TRI emissions
and that it takes about two years for these to take effect (Table 4.3). It appears that firm exodus
is the cause of the reduced emissions at the state level, but at the county level very few firms
are exiting as a result of the voting pattern. This conclusion of firm exodus at the state level is
consistent with many of the studies on firm location decisions which find that strict environmental
regulation induces firms to locate in or shift in production to less stringent counties. Given the
limitations on firm data it is not possible to identify whether the facilities simply shut down or
whether they relocated since only the number of TRI reporting facilities is used. At the county
level it may be an indication that there is actual reduction of emissions taking place and not simply
a redistribution.
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Table 4.3: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On Per Facility TRI Emissions
Pounds Pounds Pounds Pounds Pounds Pounds
Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility
(County) (State) (County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−1 -287.040 216.4225
[252.461] [286.3277]
LCVt−2 -580.626* 351.4873
[271.706] [270.2497]
LCVt−3 -560.332 521.3212
[289.0204] [268.7568]
Population 74.672 4,930.769** 74.242 4,664.9** 77.896 4,346.673**
Density [164.543] [1,027.771] [172.512] [979.8565] [181.851] [1,010.871]
Per Capita 6.445 -2.362428 7.419 -3.423442 7.656 -4.132459
Income [3.878] [4.07736] [4.193] [3.797407] [4.556] [3.812638]
Constant 32,049.64 -126,538.2 16,280.02 -124,621.8 43,169.71 -115,091.2
[98,924.89] [75,067.35] [106,925.8 ] [71,589.29] [77,804.93] [72,799.67]
Observations 21,883 700 20,322 650 18,761 600
R2 0.0030 0.0958 0.0033 0.0882 0.0034 0.0906
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
4.5 Conclusion
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine what effect congressional voting on
environmental policies has on toxic emissions at a local level. If toxic releases are decreasing, the
second objective of the model is then to identify whether it is due to facilities leaving the county
or shutting down because of increased regulatory stringency (extensive margin) or whether firms
reduce their emissions by decreasing production or installing or upgrading abatement technology
because of increased regulatory stringency (intensive margin). The third objective of the model
is to run the same empirical analysis using both county-level and state-level data to compare the
results in order to see if anything is to be gained from taking advantage of within-state variation.
I use county-level measures of pro-environment voting from the U.S. House of Representatives
as a proxy for regional heterogeneity in preferences of citizens for more or less regulation. U.S.
Representatives are more accountable to their constituents because of the frequency of re-election
and because they represent a smaller geographical region. Even though constructing county-level
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measures of voting scores requires a degree of approximation in counties that lie partially in multiple
districts, the fact that county lines do not change with the decennial Census allows for measures of
emissions activity in specific locations over time using panel data spanning more than ten years.
People living in low-income and minority communities are the most directly affected by toxic
releases and prefer more regulation since they cannot afford to self-select into cleaner neighborhoods.
They are also the groups that are least likely to engage in collective action against polluters or
to lobby politicians to make their voices heard. Assuming that legislators take different groups
preferences into account when deciding how to vote on different policies, if they are voting more
pro-environment at the national level, this indicates that there is overwhelming pressure from those
groups at the local as well.
The results show that pro-environment voting scores at the county level are associated with
a reduction in TRI emissions within one to three years after the voting has occurred. Significance
at the county level but not at the state level would suggest that changes are taking place in
emissions across counties within states rather than across states because LCV scores represent
local preferences and not preferences for the state as a whole. It appears that firm exodus is the
cause of the reduced emissions at the state level, but at the county level very few firms are exiting
as a result of the voting pattern. This conclusion of firm exodus at the state level is consistent
with many of the studies on firm location decisions which find that strict environmental regulation
induces firms to locate in or shift in production to less stringent counties. At the county level it
may be an indication that there is actual reduction of emissions taking place and not simply a
redistribution. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to construct county-level
measures of pro-environmental voting from the U.S. House of Representatives and use them as a
proxy for citizen preferences for regulation to determine their effect on toxic releases at a local level.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Top 50% of Emitting Counties (1988-2002)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LCV score 23,444 36.89369 29.06418 0 100
TRI pounds (stack air) 23,505 897,266 2,731,773 0 1.19e+08
TRI reporting facilities 23,505 8.5612 18.1613 0 486
Per-facility emissions 23,505 182,606.3 945,129.4 0 6.50e+07
Per-capita income 23,505 19,923.31 5,601.505 7,380 61,759
Population density 23,505 132.4999 555.7981 0 13,582
∆ LCV score 21,866 -.9736862 17.65127 -92 92
∆ TRI pounds 21,938 -15,957.49 892,607.9 -3.39e+07 2.35e+07
∆ TRI facilities 21,938 -.0062905 1.828708 -53 39
States (1988-2002)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LCV score (U.S House average) 750 46.30506 24.27527 0 100
TRI pounds (stack air) 750 2.83e+07 2.90e+07 37,296 1.44e+08
TRI reporting facilities 750 284.128 272.5141 3 1252
Per-facility emissions 750 118,420.4 152,150 2,491.004 1,691,254
Per-capita income 750 22,809.8 5,385.068 11,561.27 42,920.69
Population density 750 66.80337 92.02104 .5229201 446.4016
∆ LCV Score 700 -.637406 10.86083 -56 43
∆ TRI pounds 700 -501241.2 8,516,750 -4.12e+07 9.38e+07
∆ TRI facilities 700 .1542857 22.13909 -119 131
Chapter 5
Dissertation Conclusion
The results from chapter 2 provide support for the existence of spillovers as evidenced by
the reduction of non-VOC emissions associated with nonattainment status of 1-hour ozone. The
reduction of overall TRI emissions is caused by reductions of both VOCs and non-VOCs. Since
the number of TRI reporting facilities is decreasing and there is a lack of a statistically significant
relationship between ozone nonattainment and pounds of emissions per facility, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the exodus of facilities is the primary reason for decreased emissions. The re-
duction of unregulated carbon dioxide emissions associated with cropland production due to ozone
nonattainment is further evidence of spillover effects.
The results from chapter 3 suggest that some spillover effects from the regulation of ozone exist
which lead to a slight reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Since facility numbers are increasing,
but emissions per facility are decreasing, then firms are emitting less and that is the primary factor
causing the reduced emissions. Cleaner facilities entering the county is a possible story consistent
with this scenario. This is likely due to updating production methods or installing new technology
as required by the New Source Review permit program for any new facilities in nonattainment
counties, which should reduce a wide range of pollutants. These results are significant because they
show that it may not be necessary to directly regulate every pollutant.
To the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to address these air quality regulatory
spillovers and thus report such findings. Important implications of these findings would be that not
accounting for these spillovers could lead policy-makers to significantly underestimate the potential
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benefits (in terms of reduced pollution levels) associated with the NAAQS. Also this analysis pro-
vides additional credibility for the use of nonattainment status as a proxy for regulatory stringency.
The results from chapter 4 show that pro-environment voting scores at the county level
are associated with a reduction in TRI emissions within one to three years after the voting has
occurred. Significance at the county level but not at the state level would suggest that changes
are taking place in emissions across counties within states rather than across states because LCV
scores represent local preferences and not preferences for the state as a whole. It appears that firm
exodus is the cause of the reduced emissions at the state level, but at the county level very few firms
are exiting as a result of the voting pattern. This conclusion of firm exodus at the state level is
consistent with many of the studies on firm location decisions which find that strict environmental
regulation induces firms to locate in or shift in production to less stringent counties. At the county
level it may be an indication that there is actual reduction of emissions taking place and not simply
a redistribution. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to construct county-level
measures of pro-environmental voting from the U.S. House of Representatives and use them as a
proxy for citizen preferences for regulation to determine their effect on toxic releases at a local level.
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Appendix A
Trend Analysis Around Time of Switch In Nonattainment Status
The counties that make a switch in attainment status for ozone do so in different years.
The first step is to standardize the counties in order to compare them. I treat switches from
nonattainment to attainment and switches from attainment to nonattainment separately. First, I
group all counties that make a switch from nonattainment to attainment. There are 147 counties
that made this switch. For each county, I define the year of the switch from nonattainment to
attainment as year 0 (or t = 0). The year before the switch is redefined as year -1 (or t = −1)
and the year after the switch is redefined as year 1 (or t = 1). So if county i was redesignated
as attainment in 1993, 1994 would be year 1 and 1992 would be year -1. I am concerned about
overall TRI emissions between the span of three years prior to a switch and three years after a
switch. All of the counties are then lined up in the data set according to year 0, so that each has
seven time periods (t = −3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3). One problem occurs with this group of counties.
Since the temporal span of the data ends with 2002, any switches that occur in 2002 will have no
observations post-switch. Likewise, any switches after 1999 will have some missing observations
due to the temporal limits of the data set. There are 24 counties for which this is the case and are
not included in this analysis. Therefore in Tables A.1 and A.3, there are 123 counties instead of
147 that are used to examine the switch from nonattainment to attainment. I repeat this process
for those 82 counties that make a switch from attainment to nonattainment.
Once the counties are lined up according to year of the switch, I then construct predicted val-
ues by fitting a regression line to the first four time periods for each county (years t = −3,−2,−1, 0).
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The predicted values for all seven time periods are based on the trend leading up to the switch. I
extend the regression line to the last three time periods (t = 1, 2, 3) assuming that the switch from
nonattainment to attainment will not change the trend leading up to a switch. I construct the
residuals for each county by subtracting the predicted emissions levels from the observed emissions
levels (TRIobserved - TRIpredicted). If there is no change in trend, the residuals should equal zero.
If there is a significant break in trend due to the switch from nonattainment to attainment or
attainment to nonattainment, then the residuals should be statistically significantly different from
zero. For each county I keep the residuals from years t = 1, 2, 3 and test the following hypothesis
H0 : Residuals = 0 (A.1)
HA : Residuals 6= 0 (A.2)
using a t-test with 2 degrees of freedom. This is done for both types if regime switches. The results
of these t-tests are given in Table A.2 and Table A.3. An example of a significant break from the pre-
switch trend is Sussex County, Delaware (depicted in Figure A.1) which switched from attainment
to nonattainment in 1991. In Sussex County before the switch TRI emissions are increasing and
after the switch TRI emissions are decreasing. If there is a significant break in trend, then the
switch in attainment status matters in a statistical sense. Table A.1 summarizes the t-test results
and 53 out of 123 counties that make the switch from nonattainment to attainment experience
a significant break in trend, where 31 out of 82 counties that make a switch from attainment to
nonattainment experience a significant break in trend.
Table A.1: T-test Results (Summary)
Nonattainment to Attainment Attainment to Nonattainment
Significance Counties Trend Counties Significance Counties Trend Counties
10% Level 24 Pos/Pos 1 10% Level 9 Pos/Pos 1
5% Level 24 Pos/Neg 23 5% Level 16 Pos/Neg 10
1% Level 5 Neg/Neg 3 1% Level 6 Neg/Neg 7
Neg/Pos 26 Neg/Pos 13
Total ≤ 10% 53 Total ≤ 10% 31
Total Counties 123 Total Counties 82
82
Figure A.1: Attainment to Nonattainment (Sussex County, DE)
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Table A.2: T-test Results By County (Switch from Attainment to Nonattainment)
County P-value Significance County (cont) P-value Significance
AL.SHELBY 0.5435 NY.SARATOGA 0.0121 **
CA.ALAMEDA 0.5963 NY.SCHENECTADY 0.0883 *
CA.CONTRA COSTA 0.084 * OH.DELAWARE 0.4351
CA.SAN MATEO 0.0332 ** OH.FRANKLIN 0.3505
CA.SANTA CLARA 0.4521 OH.LICKING 0.0115 **
DE.KENT 0.0636 * OH.MEDINA 0.0926 *
DE.SUSSEX 0.3762 OH.WOOD 0.6862
GA.CHEROKEE 0.0022 *** PA.BLAIR 0.1498
IL.GRUNDY 0.0948 * PA.CAMBRIA 0.0302 **
IL.KENDALL 0.0806 * PA.MERCER 0.2635
IL.MC HENRY 0.1909 PA.SOMERSET 0.3846
IL.WILL 0.3507 SC.CHEROKEE 0.0079 ***
IN.VANDERBURGH 0.1137 TN.KNOX 0.8988
KY.DAVIESS 0.2463 TX.CHAMBERS 0.1012
KY.FAYETTE 0.1405 TX.COLLIN 0.3366
KY.GREENUP 0.161 TX.DENTON 0.2453
KY.HANCOCK 0.359 TX.FORT BEND 0.0946 *
KY.MARSHALL 0.2701 TX.HARDIN 0.1075
KY.OLDHAM 0.2433 TX.MONTGOMERY 0.2875
KY.SCOTT 0.0322 ** VA.CHESAPEAKE CTY 0.2518
MD.CECIL 0.151 VA.COLONIAL HTS CTY 0.0457 **
MD.CHARLES 0.3236 VA.HAMPTON CTY 0.0854 *
MD.FREDERICK 0.0578 * VA.HANOVER 0.0039 ***
ME.HANCOCK 0.3491 VA.HOPEWELL CTY 0.3733
NC.DAVIDSON 0.0281 ** VA.JAMES CTY 0.2663
NC.DAVIE 0.038 ** VA.NEWPORT NEWS CTY 0.2059
NC.DURHAM 0.4124 VA.NORFOLK CTY 0.1151
NC.FORSYTH 0.9078 VA.PORTSMOUTH CTY 0.0146 **
NC.GASTON 0.5652 VA.SMYTH 0.9576
NC.GRANVILLE 0.1049 WA.KING 0.2193
NC.GUILFORD 0.549 WA.PIERCE 0.1378
NC.WAKE 0.0472 ** WA.SNOHOMISH 0.0089 ***
NY.DUTCHESS 0.1441 WI.KEWAUNEE 0.9336
NY.ERIE 0.5978 WI.MANITOWOC 0.0233 **
NY.ESSEX 0.0263 ** WI.WALWORTH 0.1112
NY.GREENE 0.2195 WI.WASHINGTON 0.1063
NY.JEFFERSON 0.0206 ** WV.CABELL 0.1025
NY.MONTGOMERY 0.0435 ** WV.KANAWHA 0.0267 **
NY.NIAGARA 0.1685 WV.PUTNAM 0.0316 **
NY.ORANGE 0.0026 *** WV.WAYNE 0.1324
NY.RENSSELAER 0.0051 *** WV.WOOD 0.3469
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Appendix B
Additional Tables
Additional tables from Chapter 4.
Table B.1: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On TRI Emissions (4-5 Year Lags)
Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds Total Pounds
(County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−4 -296.375 -39,842.36
[580.554] [50,135.78]
LCVt−5 353.516 -24,848.22
[603.925] [53,974.59]
Population -820.504* 784,209.4** -649.692 742,870**
Density [358.372] [190,156.6] [367.621] [205,022.7]
Per Capita 2.935 -2,003.081** 7.031 -1,917.258*
Income [9.374] [716.7342] [10.012] [781.702]
Constant 883,966.9** 3.31e+07 792,556.1** 1.49e+07
[167,818.8] [1.93e+07] [255,684.8] [1.55e+07]
Observations 17,200 550 15,638 500
R2 0.0170 0.2052 0.0191 0.2120
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table B.2: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On TRI Facilities (4-5 Year Lags)
Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities
(County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−4 .00145 .12702
[.00124] [.12247]
LCVt−5 .00139 .12368
[.00115] [.11247]
Population -.000649 -.47191 .000281 -.21172
Density [.000768] [.46449] [.000701] [.42723]
Per Capita -.000258** -.0069915 -.000174** -.0050948**
Income [.0000201] [.0017508] [.0000191] [.0016289]
Constant 13.656** 513.7995** 12.613** 406.6307**
[.360] [47.07535] [.487] [32.31146]
Observations 17,200 550 15,638 500
R2 0.0364 0.2644 0.0312 0.2646
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table B.3: Results - Effect of LCV Scores On Per Facility TRI Emissions (4-5 Year Lags)
Pounds Pounds Pounds Pounds
Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility Per Facility
(County) (State) (County) (State)
LCVt−4 -190.105 570.0449*
[314.0902] [287.9047]
LCVt−5 -5.5005 2 66.4511
[337.755] [294.6373]
Population 75.204 4,139.443** 78.808 4,069.3**
Density [193.886] [1091.974] [205.598] [1119.181]
Per Capita 9.0334 -4.136407 9.441 -4.20574
Income [5.0713] [4.115846] [5.599147] [4.267167]
Constant 5,783.291 -101,459.6 -54,302.31 -96,950.68
[90,793.06] [110669] [142,995.7] [84643.15]
Observations 17,200 550 15,638 500
R2 0.0032 0.0909 0.0033 0.0907
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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Table B.5: Speakers of the House from 1988-2002
Speaker Party State District Years
Jim Wright Democrat Texas 12 1988 - 1989
Tom Foley Democrat Washington 5 1989 - 1995
Newt Gingrich Republican Georgia 6 1995 - 1999
Dennis Hastert Republican Illinois 14 1999 - 2002
* In 1989, Jim Wright (Texas) stepped down as Speaker of the House.
Tom Foley (Washington) was elected to replace him.
* These districts will be missing votes in the dataset since Speakers
of the House vote at their own discretion.
